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David S. Cohen* REGULATING REGULATORS: 
T H E  LEGAL ENVIRONMENT O F  T H E  STATE? 
One purpose of law is to reduce the costs of accidents through their 
reallocation by the state.' In this paper I analyse a particular and 
problematical application of that idea - the impact of tort on accidents' 
* Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia 
t This paper was written with the assistance of a research grant from the Social Sciences 
and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Much of this paper was written while I 
was a visiting professor at the Faculty of Law of the University of Toronto in 
conjunction with the Connaught Program in Legal Theory. I have benefited from 
discussions at the Law and Economic Workshop at the University of Toronto and from 
comments by Professor Michael Trebilcock. I thank my research assistant, James 
Penner who contributed much to this paper. In particular, the descriptions of current 
bureaucratic practices and the treatment of damage claims against the federal govern- 
ment would not have been possible without his perseverance and conscientiousness. 
I To be precise, one function of tort law is to reduce the risk of accident losses. To  a large 
extent my analysis will adopt an ex ante perspective on law. That is, I will analyse and 
evaluate legal rules and processes in the light of their influence on the accident- 
avoidance behaviour of governments and bureaucrats that will take place after the rule 
has been articulated. 
2 The term 'accidents' is intended to exclude from analysis losses that are the product of 
deliberate distributive judgments by representative institutions. 1 will assume for the 
purposes of this paper that if legislative bodies redistribute wealth, it is inappropriate 
forjudicial institutions to interfere with that decision. Thus, tort liability as I conceive it 
is trumped by a demonstration that the loss was actually a disguised form of taxation. 
See J. Quinn and M.J. Trebilcock 'Compensation, Transition Costs, and Regulatory 
Change' (1982) 32 UTLJ I 17, at 173. AS Richard Epstein has said, there is 'a circular 
and self-defeating quality upon insistence upon explicit compensation': 'Taxation, 
Regulation and Confiscation' (1982) 20 Osgoode Hall LJ 433, at 436. 
The difficulty, of course, is to distinguish between inadvertent accidents and taxation 
decisions. One also has to determine how to respond when the government decises ex 
post to characterize an inadvertent accident as a taxation decision -that is, should what 
was an accident then be recognized as a non-accident? Perhaps one technique to 
achieve the first objective is to presume that losses are inadvertent unless the state 
demonstrates and acknowledges that it was engaged in wealth redistribution. One 
advantage of this technique is that costs associated with discovery against the state 
would be borne by the state rather than by victims. It is probably true that if costs were 
allocated in this fashion they would be lower than if they were allocated to random 
members of the public who happened to be victimized by state action. This 
presumption appears to be operating in currentjudicial decisions. See City of Kamloqps 
v. NieOen [ig84] 2 SCR I ,  10 DLR (4th) 64 I ;  Dorschell v. City of Cambridge (1980) I 17 DLR 
(3d) 630 (Ont. CA). 
My analysis will exclude an examination of contract claims against the state. The 
contract liability of the state involves questions of bureaucratic financial accountability, 
and must take into account the ability of the parties to allocate risks ex ante. Assuming 
that the parties have negotiated a contract, it is possible to argue that liability rules 
should reflect the private arrangements the parties reached or ought to have reached. 
See R. Coase 'The Problem of Social Cost' ( 1  960) 3 J. of Law &? Econ. 1. 
(1990), 40 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW JOURNAL 2 13 
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generated by the activities of the state itself through public bureaucrats 
and public bureaucracies.3 My object is to evaluate the role of liability rules 
in reducing primary accident costs,4 and in particular to examine the 
incentive effects of liability rules on the behaviour of the state as an 
institution as well as on individual state actors.5 
It is true that allocative efficiency may suggest the establishment of 
loss-shifting mechanisms even if primary accident costs are unaffected by 
liability rules. For example, it may be possible to justify compensation if a 
shifting of losses from the individual to the community reduces the effect 
of accidents that do  occur, and it may be that the distributive conse- 
quences of loss-shifting will increase aggregate social welfare. Yet in these 
cases I am not justifying compensation on the ground that bureaucrats 
will act differently in the future -with associated benefits related to a 
reduction in the number and magnitude of accidents. Rather, I am 
arguing for compensation on the ground that loss-spreading is allocativ- 
ely efficient in its own right.6 
In this paper I focus on the first issue - that is, the ability of tort law to 
reduce primary costs, o r  losses associated with the number and seriousness 
of accidents.? In one sense I will be analysing the state as if it were a private 
3 I should point out that this paper envisages the state as an institution that engages in 
activities with allocative implications and is motivated to allocate its own resources 
efficiently. There are no doubt innumerable other equally (and perhaps more) 
virtuous social objectives in addition to efficiency. This focus on the state and efficiency 
does not mean that efficiency is the only or the most important normative idea in 
government. It is one; and it is one that is susceptible to an analysis that focuses on the 
incentive effect of economic signals generated by compensation awards. 
4 'Primary costs' refers to the subset of the losses associated with accidents which are a 
product of the magnitude and severity of the losses and the probability of the 
occurrence of the event that generates the loss. It is distinguishable from secondary 
costs, which relate to the distribution of losses across members of society, and tertiary 
costs, which relate to the administrative costs of loss-shifting institutions and instruments. 
5 Two earlier efforts using economic analysis to investigate government liability are M. 
Spitzer 'An Economic Analysis of Sovereign Immunity in Tort' (1977) 50 SO. Cal. LR 
515, and F .  James 'Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their Officers' (1955) 2 2  
U. Chi. LR 610. 
I will assume for the purposes of this paper that victim behaviour is independent of 
the particular liability rules applied to the state. There is no doubt that if that 
assumption is relaxed, optimal rules evaluated in terms of their ability to reduce 
primary accident costs will be substantially different from the proposals offered here. 
See L. Kaplow 'An Economic Analysis of Transition Rules' (1986) gg Ham. LR 51 I .  
6 Guido Calabresi refers to this phenomenon as 'secondary cost avoidance.' See G. 
Calabresi The Costs of Accidatc (New Haven: Yale University Press 1970). The benefits 
associated with shifting losses from one person to many are derived in part from the 
concept of diminishing marginal utility of money, in which the injury associated with 
the loss of one's last dollar is considered to be marginally less than the injury associated 
with the loss of the second last dollar, which is less than the injury associated with the 
loss of the third last dollar, and so on. 
7 Others have analyzed governmental liability using this functional approach. See, for 
example, S.H. Nahmod 'Section 1983 and the "Background" of Tort Liability' (1974) 
50 Ind. LJ 5, at 32-3. 
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firm in which losses suffered by private individuals and firms are 
externalities.' Several years ago Mark Spitzer wrote a paper on this topic 
in which he posited several models of state activity and analysed the 
incentive effects of liability rules in each case.9 In my view Spitzer's 
general conclusion - 'the rule which may be synthesized from all of the 
models is that the government should be suable in tort"O - is supportable, 
if at all, only under very constrained assumptions about state activity and 
the operations of the review institution. If one looks only at the incentive 
effects of tort law on public bureaucracies, one must conclude that the 
optimal liability rule applicable to state action is a 'no liability' rule. 
In evaluating tort law and state action it is important to recognize the 
contexts in which state liability may arise. Tort claims under the federal 
Crown Liability Act" have been brought in respect of economic losses 
suffered during labour disputes,'" personal injuries in the case of 
care-taking responsibilities,'3 economic losses in the case of alleged 
political patronage,I4 and economic losses associated with inadequate 
regulation of trust companies.15 Tort law as a regulatory tool is perhaps 
best understood if it is considered in a limited set of bureaucratic activities. 
One familiar example of the intersection of tort law and government 
action is the losses associated with the delivery of specific kinds of public 
goods, such as the injuries associated with the non-delivery of police 
services. In order to clarify some of the ideas in this paper I will analyse 
the liability of the government and individual state officials for losses with 
reference to the enforcement of legislation by police officers.16 I have 
chosen this example for several reasons. First, many of the limited 
empirical data that have been collected on the impact of liability rules on 
state action describes police behaviour, and a substantial portion of the 
analytical and theoretical articles on government liability have dealt with 
polide-associated injuries.'7 Second, ;significant number of the adminis- 
8 This perspective is not common. See L. Kaplow 'An Economic Analysis of Legal 
Transitions' (1986) gg Ham.  LR 509, at 563. 
g M. Spitzer 'An Economic Analysis of Sovereign Immunity in Tort' (1977) 50 SO. Cal. LR 
515. 
l o  Ibid. 537 
11 RSC 1970, C. C-38, s. 3 
12  C a d i a n  PacificAirLines v. The Queen rig771 1 FC 715, appeal dismisses [ig7g] 1 FC 39. 
13 Kezar el al. v. The Queen et al. [ig77] 2 W W R  8 3  
14 Nadeau v. The Queen [lg77] FC 54 1 
15 Baird v. The Queen (1983) 148 DLR (3d) 1 
16 At the same time, there is no reason to believe that my assessment of liability rules and 
the state should be limited to the police, since most other government units share the 
critical characteristics which suggest that state liability should not be modelled on ~ d e a s  
derived from private tort law. 
17 See Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc. Survey ofPoliceMitconduct Litigation 
1967-1971 (Evanston, Ill. ig74), cited in E.J. Littlejohn 'Civil Liability and the Police 
Officer: The  Need for New Deterrents to Police Misconduct' (1981) 58 U .  Detroit J. of 
Urban Law 365, at  381-2 n86 and accompanying text. 
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trative and legislative reforms in the area of government liability have 
involved the police and police ins t i tu t i~ns . '~  Third, the police typically 
engage in activities that have a private analogue, such as automobile- 
driving, as well as in activities that have no private analogue, such as 
arresting or protecting private citizens. Fourth, the police operate in 
relatively complex bureaucratic institutions, and the impact of liability 
rules is influenced by the institutional environment in which bureaucrats 
operate. Fifth, the police institution is easily perceived to be independent, 
at least to some degree, from the government. This independence may be 
important and is often lost sight of when discussing the liability of 
government departments and other sub-bureaus. Sixth, a substantial 
number of police liability cases have been litigated,'g and one can draw on 
written iudicial reasons as well as case results for information on how the 
" 
courts as an institution are responding to claims for compensation. 
In part I of this paper I consider the appropriate 'object' of liability 
rules. The choices of liability 'objects' include the state (which can be liable 
directly or vicariously), individual bureaucrats, and a range of sub- 
bureaus within the government, including Crown corporations and 
departments. In the case of direct state liability, the liabilityrule is applied 
to the government, which can respond to the liability risk in any way it 
chooses.'" In the case of personal bureaucratic liability, the liability rule is 
applied to the bureaucrat, who can respond in any way she chooses." In 
18 The most significant legislative action in this context is section 25 of the Criminal Code, 
~ s c  1970, C. c-34, which affords protection to police officers exercising powers under 
the Code if they act on 'reasonable and probable grounds.' 
19 The litigation against the police falls into a range of cases. On wrongful arrest and 
detention, see Butt v. Saint and Loveless (1983) 38 Nfld. & P E ~ R  15 (Nfld SCTD) ($500 
damages awarded to plaintiff who was detained by police officer without being 
arrested); Langv. Burch and CarOon (1981) 8 Sask. R. 96, affd sub nom. Lung v. Burch et 
al. (1982) 140 DLR (3d) 325 ($5,000 damages awarded to plaintiff for wrongful arrest); 
Rumilly v. Weatherhead (1975) 55 DLR (3d) 607 (BCSC) ($300 awarded to plaintiff where 
police officers continued detention after having learned that plaintiff was not the 
person they suspected him to be). On actions for assault and battery, see Sandison v. 
Rybiah (1973) 39 DLR (3d) 366 (Ont. HC) ($3,500 awarded to plaintiff who was beaten 
after demanding explanation for arrest of another person. On actions for misuse of 
firearms, see Woodward v. Begbie (1962) 31 DLR (2d) 22,  132 ccc 145 (Ont. HC) ($518.80 
awarded to plaintiff who was shot without cause by police officer). On actions for illegal 
search and seizure, see Win Gat v. Johmon ( I  908) q WLR 293 (Sask. CA) ($100 awarded to 
plaintiff whose house was broken into by police). 
2 0  Presumably, the responsechosen by the government would maximize its welfare within 
constraints imposed by limited information and constitutional principles. If we are 
concerned with maximizing aggregate social welfare, and if we think that the 
government and social welfare do not necessarily coincide, then subsidiary liability 
rules must be developed which constrain the responses of the state to liability risks and 
losses. 
21  Of course, it is possible to establish secondary liability rules that prevent certain 
responses. At the same time, it would be difficult to monitor those secondary rules. 
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the case of vicarious liability, the victim must demonstrate that a particular 
bureaucrat committed a tort; once that threshold test is met, liability is 
imposed on the government without any further requirement." If one 
decides in favour of a system of liability rules, which I do not, then the 
optimal liability regime will impose accident costs either on the state or  on 
the sub-units of the government, and not on individual bureaucrats. 
In part 11 I analyse government liability; it is assumed that the activities 
and choices made by the relevant state actors are efficient. Under that 
assumption it can be argued that losses need not be internalized. Tort law 
is usually necessary to force private firms to take social costs into account. 
If the state is currently taking into account all social costs, then it does not 
appear to be necessary to use tort law to internalize private losses. The  
idea underlying government immunity is that to some extent the state will 
take into account the welfare of potential victims of state action.'3 
Bureaucratic institutions operating according to this model will make 
decisions that maximize social welfare, and will make those decisions 
whether or not they are subject to liability in tort. If the government is 
working perfectly, then, as is the case when markets are working 
perfectly, tort law is unnecessary from the point of view of efficiency 
analysis, and a 'no-liability' rule is optimal. In part 11 I also analyse 
government liability in the case of two different kinds of inefficient state 
action. In some cases the state and bureaucrats are motivated to act 
efficiently, but for one or  more reasons they fail to do so. In other cases, 
the state and bureaucrats are motivated to act inefficiently. If one assumes 
inefficient government decisions, then an argument in favour of shifting 
the losses to the state can be made; but that argument holds only if one 
assumes, first, that the loss-internalization regime is cost justified and, 
second, that the state will respond to the loss-shifting in a particular 
manner. 
In part 111 I explore whether and in what circumstances loss-shifting is 
cost-justified. I conclude that even if liability rules might appear to be an 
appropriate loss-internalization tool we would not necessarily choose 
liability rules based on models employed in the private sector. In assessing 
the desirability of liability rules we should be concerned with their 
marginal net benefits, which might be relatively small given the transac- 
tion and error costs of establishing and using court or non-court insti- 
tutions and the existence of alternative loss-internalization instruments. 
22 That is, vicarious state liability represents a strict liability regime once it is determined 
that a bureaucrat committed a tort. 
23 I explore the implications of  the opposite assumption - that public bureaucrats are 
motivated to maximize private welfare - in part v. This assumption is widely discussed 
in the public choice literature. See, for example, D.C. Mueller Public Choice (Cam- 
bridge: Cambridge University Press 1979) at 148-70. 
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In part IV I assess the response of the state to liability rules, and argue 
that it is highly unlikely that the state will respond to contingent liability 
risks so as to reduce accident costs in the same fashion as private firms. 
Thinking about the legal environment of the state necessarily involves an 
inquiry into the impact of liability on state action. A critical assumption 
behind recommendations to expand government liability is that govern- 
ments react to liability rules like a private economic actor. In contrast, a 
'no liability' rule is optimal when the government and bureaucratic 
agencies do not react to economic incentives at all. That is, only if one 
assumes that the state is constrained, like a private firm, by relatively 
efficient markets in labour, products, and capital can one predict that, ex 
ante, the state will react to liability risks by adopting efficient accident- 
reduction measures. In part IV I analyse government liability rules in the 
light of the government institution's ability to pass those costs on to its 
constituents through self-insurance, legislative loss-shifting, and similar 
mechanisms. This aspect of government liability is peculiarly sensitive to 
the particular level of government under study. The ability of govern- 
ments to shift losses to their constituents depends on the level of political 
competition they face, and on the particular taxing powers available to 
them; we can assume that, as between the market and the tax system, the 
state will use the latter to shift losses. Only if the effect of liability rules is 
the establishment of efficient systems of internal administrative disci- 
pline, can they be justified on the basis of the evaluative criterion 
described earlier.'4 
In part v I explore several possible liability rules that might be 
implemented in a subset of government activities. Even if one accepts that 
only the net marginal benefits of liability rules count, some might argue 
that there may be some general distinctions, which, while imperfect, 
might be relatively easily applied, and which might generate optimal rules 
in a limited subset of cases. For example, in the case of enterprise 
organizations,'5 one might assume that the public enterprise will be 
24 G.A.-~ermann 'Integrating Governmental and Officer Tort Liability' (1977) 77 Col. LR 
i 175, at 1202. In investigating these aspects of state liability, I draw on the limited 
empirical data which attempt to describe the influence, if any, of current state liability 
on state action in Canada and the United States, and reach some tentative conclusions 
about the desirability of that regulatory impact. Several American studies suggest that 
existing liability rules have had little influence on state action. These studies can be 
contrasted with judicial references to the potential chilling effect of liability rules on 
bureaucrats. In evaluating these data it is important to remember that the bureaucracy 
is not a monolith, and that it may be impossible to extrapolate the preliminary findings 
beyond the particular bureaucracy in which they were generated. 
25  By this I mean institutions, controlled by government, usually organized onacorporate 
model, which are engaged in delivering goods or services to the public using market 
mechanisms. The use of these arrangements by the government to implement public 
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attempting to maximize profits, and that it should operate subject to 
liability rules analogous to those applicable to the private economic actors. 
It may be difficult, however, to distinguish between government and 
enterprise organizations. Even if the distinction can be made, we may 
want to recognize the 'public' aspect of public enterprises, and if the firm 
is acting as a social welfare maximizer, our  model should not oblige it to 
internalize social costs it already has taken into account. I also explore the 
possibility of imposing liability on sub-units of government, but again 
conclude that it is unlikely that such a liability regime will itself 
significantly influence state action. 
I Bureaucratic or state liability? 
Until recently, governments have not been directly liable in tort for losses 
associated with their a~tivities. '~ Since the Second World War, however, 
several national, state, and provincial governments have enacted statutes 
that establish a mixed system of direct and vicarious liability. Under 
current state-liability statutes, the federal state is directly liable to 
D 
policy grew rapidly during the post-war era. In recent years large numbers have been 
'privatized,' usually through the distribution of the government's ownership interest in 
equity markets. The degree of government control, the extent to which the govern- 
ment enterprise approximates corporate models, and the extent to and the ways in 
which non-market considerations are permitted to influence the enterprise's decisions 
vary considerably from institution to institution, and there is no 'bright line' to 
distinguish private and public enterprises in this context. See M.J. Trebilcock and 
J.R.S. Prichard 'Crown Corporations: The Calculus of Instrument Choice' in J.R.S. 
Prichard (ed.) Crown Corporations in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths 1983). 
26 To  be precise, the text might read as follows: 'The Crown in Right of Canada is not, in 
the absence of statute, liable in tort.' For the purposes of this paper I will refer to the 
Canadian 'government' or  'state' instead of the 'Crown in right of Canada.' 
There are few historical descriptions of government liability in Canada. The 
historical essays by Borchard and Holdsworth describe the English experience, which 
for all intents and purposes is the same as ours. See W.I.C. Binnie 'Attitudes toward 
State Liability in Tort: A Comparative Study' (1 964) 22 U. Tor. Fac. of Law Rev. 88; D.W. 
Mundell 'Remedies against the Crown' in Remedies (Special Lectures of the Law Society 
of Upper Canada, 1961) 149; B.L. Strayer 'Crown Immunity and Judicial Review' in 
O.E. Lang (ed.) Contemporaly Proble~nr of Public Law in Canada (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press 1968) at 71; W. Mueller 'The Liability of the Ontario Government in 
Tort' (1967) 25 U. Tor. Fac. of Law Rev. 3; W.S. Holdsworth 'The History of Remedies 
against the Crown' (1922) 38 Law QR 141, at 280; and E. Borchard 'Government 
Liability in Tort' (1948) 26 Can. Bar Rev. 399. 
The immunity is often incorrectly attributed to the application of the maxim 'the 
King can do no wrong.' See M. Aronson and H. Whitmore Public Torts and Contracts 
(Sydney: Law Book Co. 1982) at 1. Other conclusory reasons include the alleged 
absence ofjurisdiction over the sovereign offered by Locke J in CBC v. Attorney General 
for Ontario [1959] SCR 188, at 204, and the Holmesian logic that there can be no legal 
right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends, which 
Holmes J expressed in Kawananakoa v. Polyblank 205 u s .  349, at 353 ( I  907). 
Heinonline - -  40 U. Toronto L.J. 219 1990 
2 2 0  UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW JOURNAL 
compensate a limited class of plaintiffs in cases of damage sustained while 
on federal government property, o r  as an employee of the federal 
government. In all other cases, which comprise the vast majority of claims 
and the greatest percentage of losses, government liability is vicarious.'7 
In this latter category liability is imposid jointly and severally on the state 
as an institution and on individual bureaucrats;" a prerequisite to state 
liability is the commission of a tort by an individual civil servant. 
The choice of this liability regime has an important impact on the ability 
of the tort system to internalize social costs. TO the extent that accidents 
are associated with institutional activities - that is, the planned, co- 
ordinated, and structured actions of numbers of individuals in the 
context of achieving governmental objectives - the retention of a 
vicarious liability model makes it impossible to shift losses to the state.'g 
Many injuries apparently associated with an  individual bureaucrat result 
from 'systemic problems' within the bureaucratic agency,s0 and imposing 
liability at the lowest level of the organization may not be an effective 
means of modifying institutional behaviour.3' similarly, if it is impossible 
to determine the identity of a bureaucrat who committed a tort, accident 
losses will be externalized.3' Moreover, to the extent that uncompensated 
litigation costs are associated with the requirement that the plaintiff 
27 For example, under section 3(1) of the federal Crown Liability Act, RSC 1970, C. c-38, 
the federal government is liable directly for breahces of common law duties associated 
with the ownership and occupation of property, for breaches of common law duties 
associated with its status as an employer, and for statutory torts. It is vicariowly liable 'in 
respect of a tort committed by a servant of the Crown' under the same section. Section 
4(2) confirms that liability cannot be imposed unless an individual bureaucrat is found 
to be personally responsible. 
28 The federal government Claims Regulations, CRC I 978, c. 683, s. 14, specifically outline 
the factors determining when and the extent to which the government can, in effect, 
'claim contribution' - that is, be reimbursed by the public servant for the cost of her 
torts. 
29 This important limiting concept is also apparent in the law of nuisance, where the 
courts have demanded that a loss be 'actionable at common law' before they will impose 
liability on public institutions. See Caledonian Rwy v. Ogily (1856) 2 Macq. 229 (HL) and 
The Queen v. Loiselle (1962) 35 DLR (2d) 274, at 276 (SCC). 
30 It has been argued, for example, that 'abuses of prosecutorial authority are not 
inherent in discretion; rather, they are contingent upon the context and manner in 
which discretion is exercised.' See P.J. Utz 'Two Models of Prosecutorial Professional- 
ism' in W.F. McDonald (ed.) TheProsecutor(Beverly Hills: Sage Publications 1979) 119. 
The injuries suffered by private citizens are associated with the institution's structure 
and operations. As Owen Fiss has said, the 'wrong is the structure itself,' and thus the 
remedy must be directed at the structure to prevent the continuation of the injury. See 
O.M. Fiss The Civil Rights Injunction (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1978) at 
11. 
3 1 See 'Developments in the Law - Section I 983 and Federalism' (1977) go Ham. LR I 133, 
at 1218-14. 
32 See D.H. ~ a c k  'Actions against the Crown' in Suing the Government - A  Conference Report 
(Toronto: Insight Educational Services 1981) 26. 
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demonstrate wersonal bureaucratic liability, fewer lawsuits will be under- 
taken,33 and i s  a plaintiffs expected litigation costs increase the expected 
value of the lawsuit must increase to.justify her investment.34 
Judges have reacted to this difficulty byimposing vicarious liability on 
the state for the torts of groups of bureaucrats35 and by imposing liability 
when 'there is a reasonable case of action in tort against one [bureau- 
crat]'S6 but there is a considerable risk that an inability to pierce the 'black 
box' of the bureaucratic state will substantially reduce the likelihood of 
successful lawsuits. For example, it is difficult to conceive of a personal 
liability regime dealing with the inadequate servicing of penal facilities, 
with allegedly excessive security measures in municipal jails,37 with 
systemic police brutality,38 and with injuries associated with racial 
discrimination.39 Moreover, simply imposing vicarious liability does little 
to solve this problem, since identification of the individual bureaucrat 
who committed a tort is a costly and difficult (if not an  impossible) task.4" 
The difficulties associated with using personal bureaucratic liability to 
- - 
internalize institutional wrongs are magnified by common law rules that 
preclude the imposition of vicarious liability on Crown corporations, 
federal administrative agencies, and superior officers for the torts of 
subordinate federal civil servants.4' An empirical study conducted in 
33 Judges have suggested that in the absence of an explanation from the government of 
the rationale for and the details of the decision-making process that gave rise to the 
injury, they will presume that the government acted in an operational capacity and 
thus, at least on this variable, is liable in negligence. See Kamloops v. Niehen, supra note 
2. 
34 The problem is exacerbated if the losses suffered by individual victims of state action 
are relatively small, in which case, unless procedural modifications are employed to 
permit the aggregation of claims, the individual plaintiff will not be motivated to sue. 
35 See Nadeau v. The Queen, supra note 14. 
36 See Stephens v. The Queen (1982) 26 CPC I (FCA) (action against the Crown in federal 
court; court does not have jurisdiction against individual bureaucrat). 
37 See Morgan v. Superintendent of Winnipeg Remand Centre el al. [1983] 3 W W R  542, at 
557-8, appeal dismissed (1983) 29 Man. R. (ad) 55. 
38 Build of Buffalo v. Sedifa 44 1 F. 2d 284 (2d Cir. 197 I )  (action by citizens of Buffalo asking 
for injunctive relief against police commissioner, the city, and individual police 
officers). 
39 See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 us. 362 (1976). In this case the Supreme Court denied 
injunctive relief, apparently on the grounds that there was no pervasive pattern of 
mistreatment. The trial court had issued an order requiring the defendants to revise 
their existing citizen-complaint procedures. See COPPAR v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp  1289 
(1973). 
40 Thus, institutional torts can be conceived of as injury-causing activities for which 
responsibility cannot be allocated to one person. The term may also refer to losses in 
situations in which individual actors are not identifiable within an organization. 
41 Viscount Canterbury v. A t t o n q  General (1  842) 1 Ph. 306 at 324; Quebec Liquor Commission 
v. Moore [1g24] SCR 540, at 55 1-2. This difficulty applies even in the corporate context, 
with the result that Crown corporations often will not be vicariously liable for the torts 
of'their'employees. The courts have held that both thecorporation and the employees 
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Connecticut in the late 1970s suggests that the same phenomenon will 
result even in the absence of judicially created immunities. That study 
examined the impact of 'constitutional tort damage claim' on the conduct 
of police officers.4' Apparently, superior officers were not appreciably 
affected by the legal actions brought against their subordinates. Of the 
149 cases studied, superior officers were never found liable for the 
constitutional violations of their line officers, were joined in only 82 suits, 
and were defendants at trial in only g cases.43 
Vicarious liability (and thus a requirement of personal bureaucratic 
responsibility) has adverse effects on the ability of the tort system to 
internalize losses for other reasons. Possibly the most important is the 
exclusion of all losses that are not currently subject to regulation in the 
private tort law system.44 It is fair to say that pure economic loss is only 
imperfectly recognized in current private tort law doctrine.45 This partial 
recognition of interests has two undesirable aspects. First, using a 
vicarious liability regime will externalize losses to the extent that the tort 
system does not recognize the interest. Second, bureaucratic behaviour, if 
it is influenced at all, will systemically respond only to litigation risks in a 
subset of cases. T h e  resulting distortions in bureaucratic behaviour can 
hardly be optimal. 
Losses may also be externalized because injuries caused by public 
institutions have no private analogue to which tort law has traditionally 
been applied. Losses associated with paradigmatic state action including 
policing, enforcement of statutes, delivering educational benefits, and 
paroling prisoners will not be allocated to the state under any model that 
simply transposes private tort law and applies it to individual bureauc- 
r a t ~ . 4 ~  Finally, the state is often engaged in delivering private and public 
are Crown employees for whom the Crown can be responsible, but that neither is 
responsible for the torts of the other. See Bainbridge v. Postmaster General [1go6] I KB 
I 78, at 191 ; Roper v. Works and Buildings Commissioners [ ~ g  151 1 KB 45; and McLean v. 
Vancouver Harbour Commissioners [1g36] 3 WWR 657 (BCSC).. 
An interesting exception to this doctrinal rule is the American decision in Carter v. 
Estelle, 519 F. zd I 136 (5th Cir. 1975)~ in which prison administrators were held 
vicariously liable for the acts of prison employees. 
42 See Project 'Suing the Police in Federal Court' (1979) 88 Yale LJ 781. 
43 Ibid. 81 1-12 
44 This point is developed more fully in D. Cohen and J.C. Smith 'Entitlement and the 
Body Politic: Rethinking Negligence in Public Law' (1986) 64 Can. Bar Rev. 1. 
45 Ibid. Until Junior Books Ltd v. Veitchi Co Ltd [1983] I AC 520, [1g82] 3 All ER 201 (HL), it 
was unlikely that a person whose only injury was financial could successfully persuade a 
judge to shift the loss to another person. 
46 The government is often engaged in activities that have no private counterpart. In 
these cases losses may not be recognized simply because it is impossible to point to a tort 
committed by the civil servant. 
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goods through non-market instruments. The reluctance of judges to 
recognize positive duties of beneficence between private individuals, 
coupled with the requirement of personal bureaucratic responsibility, 
means that losses associated with the non-receipt of government benefits 
will be internalized only in a small percentage of cases.47 
A third attribute of personal bureaucratic liability that may be 
associated with loss-externalization is the focus of judicial review on 
individual bureaucrats. It may be that the requirement that an individual 
bureaucrat be identified in the lawsuit means that the decision-maker will 
be forced to focus her attention on a specific person, perhaps giving rise to 
a bias towards the defendant - especially in the case of institutional 
plaintiffs. This elusive built-in bias is exacerbated by rules that preclude 
the disclosure of insurance and indemnification arrangements which 
might effectively shift the economic risks of liability to the state institution 
with which the bureaucrat is associated. Even here, however, the bias in 
favour of individual bureaucrats may reflect judicial notions of fairness - 
an implicit understanding that the injury will only rarely be associated 
with the activity of an individual bureaucrat, and that while the economic 
risks of litigation may be shifted, the individual bureaucrat may face other 
c0sts.4~ 
Individual bureaucratic liability may be suboptimal as a loss-internaliza- 
tion technique for other reasons. A particular bureaucrat will often be 
responsible for losses that exceed her personal wealth. Leaving aside 
issues of compensation, the bureaucrat will be indifferent to potential 
liability for losses exceeding the value of her personal assets.49 In fact, she 
may have an incentive to expend public resources on reducing the risk of 
losses of a magnitude that might affect her personal wealth rather than on 
reducing the risk of accidents in excess of that level.jO Thus, to the extent 
that we are concerned about the internalization of significant losses 
47 I have recently argued that the limitation on recovery of losses associated with 
non-receipt of government benefits should be modified. See Cohen and Smith, supra 
note 44. 
48 The emphasis on the individual defendant in cases of substantial public exposure may 
cause the public to see the 'defendant official as a wrongdoer who has committed a 
particularly offensive act ... rather than as a stand-in for his government employer.' C. 
Whitman 'Constitutional Torts' (1980) 79 Mich. LR 5, at 57-8. 
49 J.P. Murphy 'Is the Municipality Liable for Insufficiently Trained Police?' University of 
Maine Bureau of Public Administration ( I  968) 2 1 ; S. Rose-Ackerman 'Reforming 
Public Bureaucracy through Economic Incentives? no ws~v- in  Law and Econotnic 
Workshop Series, University of Toronto 1986, 25 
50 That is, if she is given a choice between spending one dollar to reduce expected accident 
costs from say, $~,ooo,ooo to $goo,ooo, and spending the same dollar to reduce 
expected accident costs from $20,000 to $~o,ooo,  a bureaucrat with a net worth of 
$zoo,ooo probably will choose the latter, less efficient, alternative. 
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associated with state action, personal bureaucratic liability will have little 
impact on bureau behaviour.5' 
Personal bureaucratic liability is also likely to generate less than optimal 
responses because of the environment in which individual bureaucratic 
decisions are made. Police officers who are faced with discretionary 
choices while engaged in law enforcement activities in which their lives 
and safety are threatened are hardly likely to engage in a cost-benefit 
analysis that might generate efficient law enforcement behaviour. Their 
uncertainty of the location of the liability line and the limited time in 
which the decision can be made both suggest that personal police 
decision-making behaviour ought not to be the object of 'tort regula- 
tion.'5' Moreover, the inability of an individual police officer to assess 
factors outside of her immediate environment, and the lack of any 
incentive to do so given the individual focus of the liability rules will lead 
to decisions that minimize personal risk and perhaps externalize losses 
away from individual bureaucrats. Those decisions may bear no relation 
to decisions that minimize risks across all bureaucratic activities. 
Although the application of liability rules that demand personal 
bureaucratic liability will result in the externalization of some losses, it 
may also lead to the opposite result. T h e  requirement that an individual 
bureaucrat be found liable in tort may be associated with over-deterrence 
- that is, with excessive accident-reduction responses by the bureaucracy. 
If bureaucrats misperceive legal risks associated with regulatory action, 
over-deterrence may take the form of less than optimal regulatory activity 
and excessive loss-prevention measures.53 Alternatively, personal liability 
rules may generate more than optimal regulation if the perceived risks 
relate to regulatory inaction. On the assumption thatjudges rarely impose 
positive obligations on the state, one can confidently predict the former 
response.54 The argument that some bureaucrats will respond in an 
inappropriate fashion to threats of personal liability may be especially 
51 One can also argue that personal liability rules encourage decentralization as a 
response to potential personal liability risks. If the decentralization would not have 
occurred otherwise, one can legitimately question its desirability. 
52 See Priorv. McNab (1976) 78 DLR (3d) 3 19, at 327 (Ont. HC), in which these factors were 
offered in support of not imposing liability on police officers who must 'frequently act 
hurriedly and react to sudden emergencies.' 
53 This argument was accepted by the Supreme Court of the United States in justifying 
the granting of absolute immunity to President Richard Nixon from damage suits in 
the case of constitutional violations. See respondents' brief in Nixon v. Fitzgerald 457 U.S. 
73 1, 102 St. Ct. 2690 (1982), discussed in A.A. Orenstein 'Presidential Immunity from 
Civil Liability' (1983) 68 Cornell LR 236, at 250. 
54 1 am assuming that the bureaucrat cannot shift the loss to the state either ex ante or ex 
post. To  the extent that insurance is available, the risk of under-regulation is reduced. 
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relevant when the bureaucrat is likely to be cognizant of legal sanctions55 
and when she is easily identifiable.S6 
There are several reasons to predict that bureaucrats will act in 
inefficient ways when faced with perceived risks of personal liability. 
There is some evidence that as a class bureaucrats are substantially more 
risk-adverse than the population as a whole.57 Assuming that they will 
bear risks personally, they will react by refusing to implement their 
regulatory responsibilities, delaying implementation, or engaging in 
defensive litigation strategies - that is, building a record in anticipation of 
lawsuits. In all cases we can anticipate inefficiencies. Further, under- 
regulation will be produced as a result of the substantial asymmetrical 
incentives associated with lawsuits as a regulatory device in the case of 
public wrongs. Where bureaucratic remuneration is independent of the 
social benefits the bureaucrats produce, officials who bear the risks of 
losses associated with their b e h a v i o ~ r ~ ~  will not be able to capture the 
benefits.59 This will be so even if we hypothesize some kind of windfall 
gains tax to internalize benefits at the governmental level.60 Certainly one 
can anticipate that bureaucrats will be rewarded through increased 
remuneration, promotions, and the like when they demonstrate that they 
are fulfilling their regulatory responsibilities; and to the extent that they 
are, one can argue that they are personally capturing some of the social 
benefits associated with their a ~ t i o n s . ~ '  None the less, it is unlikely that the 
55 The concern is most commonly voiced in the context of prosecutorial immunities. See 
- - 
Gregoire v. Bid& et al. I 77 F .  nd 579 (1949) and Owslq v. R. in Right ofOntario (1983) 34 
CPC ~6 at IOI  (Ont. HC).. 
- 
56 Nixon v. Fitzgerald, supra note 53, 2703 (S. Ct.) 
57 P.H. Schuck Suing Government: Citizen Remedies for Official Wrongs (New Haven: Yale 
University Press 1983) at 57,70; D. Bellante and A.N. Link 'Are Public Sector Workers 
More Risk Averse Than Private Sector Workers?' (198 I )  34 Industrial &?Lab. Rel. Rev. 
408 
58 This phenomenon is independent of the standard of care established for official 
liability. Michael Trebilcock and Jack Quinn made this point in 'Compensation, 
Transition Costs, and Regulatory Change' (1982) 32 UTLJ I 18, at 131-2. The 
incentive structures that bureaucrats face are likely to lead to decisions that disfavour 
compensation. 
59 As Richard Posner put it, 'There is thus an imbalance: zealous polic officers bear the 
full social costs of their mistakes through the tort system but do not receive the full 
social benefits of their successes through the compensation system.' See R.A. Posner 
'Excessive Sanctions for Governmental Misconduct in Criminal Cases' (1982) 57 Wmh. 
LR 635, at 640; R.A. Posner 'Rethinking the Fourth Amendment' [ig81] Sup. Ct. Rev. 
49, at 65; J.L. Mashaw 'Civil Liability of Government Officers: Property Rights and 
Official Accountability' (1978) 42 Law €3 Contemp. Prob. 8, at 26-7. 
60 See Kaplow, supra note 8, 570. 
61 It seems unlikely that bureaucrats could receive remuneration in the form of shares or  
options representing a proportion of tax revenues, or  increases in gross national 
product. None the less, if bureaucrats could be paid on a 'piece-work' basis, under 
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anticipated gains in any way approximate the perceived risks of personal 
liability.6' 
The  asymmetry is exacerbated by the doctrinal rules described earlier, 
which make it difficult if not impbssible to sue bureaucrats when they 
remain passive. Thus, when a bureaucrat fails to act she can anticipate 
that the persons injured as a result of her passivity, even if they can 
identify themselves or be identified, will not sue; and if they do, they 
probably will not succeed.63 Conversely, victims of state action are easy to 
identify, and are likely to attempt to obtain compensation when the losses 
are highly focused.64 The problem is well recognized in cases of 
regulatory action, where the victims are diffuse and unorganized and the 
beneficiaries are highly focused. In the case of threatened litigation the 
skewed incentives will give rise to inaction. 
..# 
Attempts to respond to the problem of skewed incentives can take 
various forms, none of which is entirely satisfactory from the point of view 
of accident-reduction analysis. First, it is common to enact 'tort privative 
clauses' that provide that a particular bureaucrat is not personally 
responsible for losses associated with her a c t i o n ~ . ~ j  Moreover, judges have 
which they would receive remuneration determined by the net social benefits they 
produced, tort law would be unnecessary. 
62 The logic of this argument might lead one to conclude that direct state liability is 
optimal, since the state (in the sense of the individuals who are members of the relevant 
community) will obtain the benefits associated with state action, and thus will npt have 
their choices biased against action. The problen~ with that argument is that the 
community does not make the decisions giving rise to the injury, nor are the benefits of 
state action allocated equally among all citizens. 
63 Lawsuits that seek compensation for bureaucratic inaction are unlikely to succeed 
because the liability of governments and bureaucrats is modelled on private liability. As 
a general rule, judges have been reluctant to impose liability on individuals for failures 
to assist others; and when this idea is transposed to the public sector, bureaucrats are 
rewarded for inefficient passivity as compared with inefficient action. See Cohen and 
Smith, supra note 44 
64 See Butz v. Economou 438 U.S. 478, 515 (1978). 
65 In addition to the Criminal Code immunity, police are protected when they exercise 
enforcement powers under provincial legislation in a number of provinces. In Ontario 
the Public Authorities Protection Act, RSO 1980, c. 406, grants extensive immunity to a 
range of public servants who commit torts in the course of carrying out their public 
duties. See Colledge v. Niagara Regzonal Police Commission (1984) 1 OAC 23 (the act does 
not apply to internal disciplinary proceedings under the Police Act); Berardinelli v. 
Ontario Housing Corporation [1979] 1 SCR 275, (1979) go DLR (3d) 481 (the act applies 
only to public and statutory responsibilities). 
In Saskatchewan, police are afforded a 'good faith' immunity under the Police Act, 
~ s s  1978, c. P- I 5, S. 19, and the Summary Offences Procedure Act, RSS 1978, c. s-63, s. 7. 
These sections were applied in Carr v. Forbes el al. (1980) 7 Sask. R. 123 (Sask. QB), 
Morrissette and Morrissette v. Salagubm and Hosaluk (1984) 32 Sask. R. 25 (Sask. QB), and 
Lang v. Bruch and CarLton (1982) 18 Sask. R. gg (Sask. CA). 
There are innumerable statutes providing for bureaucratic immunities in particular 
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established additional analogous common law i m m ~ n i t i e s . ~ ~  In one recent 
case, bureaucratic immunities were justified on the utilitarian argument 
that the externalization of losses was necessary 'for the advancement of 
the greater public good' in view of the potential impact of exposing 
bureaucrats to the risk of personal liability.67 While these statutory and 
judicial immunities are likely to be adequate in rebalancing the incentives 
faced by some groups of bureaucrats, they have the secondary effect of 
insulating the state from responsibility as well. A decision to immunize the 
bureaucrat under current vicarious liability rules may preclude the 
allocation of the loss to the state.68 
Another response to potential personal liability risks is the enactment of 
'legal defence' statutes, which provide that the state must furnish 
individual bureaucrats with legal representation o r  compensate them for 
situations. See Wildlife Act, RSBC 1979, c. 433, s. 80(3), and Diversified Holdings Ltd v. R. 
in Right of BC [1g83] 2 WWR 289 (BCCA). These statutes commonly insulate bureaucrats 
from liability when they act in 'good faith.' See Trade Practice Act, RSBC 1979, c. 406, s. 
16(1), and Liquor Control Act, RSA 1980, c. L-17, s. 77(4). 
66 The immunities that are judicially created are enjoyed for the most part by state 
officials engaged in judicial or quasi-judicial activities. The most notorious of these are 
the absolute immunities enjoyed byjudges and Crown prosecutors. See Bosada v. Pinos 
(1984) 44 OR (nd) 789, (1984) 5 ~ ~ ~ ( 4 t h )  334 (Ont. HC), and Richmanv. McMurtty (1983) 
147 DLR (3d) 748 (Ont. HC). The prosecutorial andjudicial immunities were recognized 
soon after Confederation: see The Queen v. McLeod (1883) 8 SCR I ,  at 26. In Ontario 
these judicial immunities are established under the Proceedings against the Crown Act, 
RSO 1980, c. 393, SS. 2(2)(d) and 5(b). See also Owslqr v. R .  in Right of Ontario (1983) 34 
CPC 96, at I O I  (Ont. HC). Compare Nelles v. The Queen in Right of Ontario (1985) 51 OR 
(2d) 513, at 530~23  CCLT 291, at 312 (Ont. CA), rev'd in part by (1989) 60 DLR (4th) 609 
(scc). 
American courts have adopted similar immunities forjudicial officers, justifying the 
externalization of losses on the ground that judges would be over-deterred by the 
threat of liability. See Pierson v. Ray 386 u.s. 547 (1967)~ and Stump v. Sparkman 435 U.S. 
349, at 355-6 (1978) In addition, American courts have extended these immunities to 
senior officials within the executive branch of government. See Sparlingv. V i h  161 U.S. 
483 (1896). and Baw v. Matteo 360 U.S. 564 (1959). Recently, absolute immunity was 
extended to the President of the United States, even in the case of constitutional 
violations; see Niron v. Fitzgerald 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982). 
67 Richman v. McMurtty (1983) 147 DLR (3d) 748, at 753 (Ont. HC). A similar utilitarian 
justification was offered by Judge Learned Hand in Gregoire v. Biddle 177 F. od 579, at 
581 (1949). 
In Scheuer v. Rhodes 416 U.S. 232, at 240 (1g74), the American Supreme Court 
granted 'good faith' immunity to state officers faced with constitutional 'tort' liability in 
light of 'the danger that the threat of such liability would deter his willingness toexecute 
his office with the decisiveness and the judgment required by the public good.' 
68 This does not have to be the case, since it is possible to establish personal bureaucratic 
immunity and couple it with direct state liability either on a respondeat superior basis or 
on theories of enterprise liability. See R.A. Posner 'Rethinking the Fourth Amendment' 
[1g8i] Sup. Ct. Law Rev. 49, at 67-8. See also Norton v. United States 581 F .  zd 390 (4th 
Cir. 1978). 
Heinonline - -  40 U. Toronto L.J. 227 1990 
228 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW JOURNAL 
legal e ~ ~ e n s e s , ~ g  thus reducing marginally the risks associated with 
liability rules. Alternatively, the government may enact insurance statutes 
that require government agencies to carry insurance for particular 
officers for liability incurred in the performance of their official 
responsibilities. Finally, the government may enact indemnification 
statutes that require agencies to pay damage awards ordered against an 
individual bureaucrat. In both cases the effect is to make the government 
the insurer of its employees' liability risks and thus to shift the regulatory 
impact away from the individual. The federal government employees' 
union apparently has not considered it necessary to obtain such provis- 
ions as a term of employment,7" although indemnification takes place as a 
matter of practice. Given the inability of bureaucrats to diversify the risks 
of personal liability, and in the light of the obvious fact that the risk of 
legal liability to the 'owners' of the state is diversified across the entire 
tax-paying population, one can predict substantial advantages to both 
parties through risk-shifting arrangements as an aspect of the employ- 
ment relationship.7' 
A possible private solution to the skewed incentives associated with 
personal liability is the creation of a private market in 'bureaucratic 
liability' insurance. Such insurance markets have developed to a limited 
degree in some jurisdictions, but not in Canada.7' Given the inexperience 
of insurance companies with running governments, the costs of acquiring 
information about the enterprise whose activities are associated with the 
risks it is expected to insure, and the costs of monitoring the insured's 
activities, the failure of a private insurance market to develop fully is not 
surprising; and even if insurance markets could take into account the 
uncertainties associated with public activities, the provision of the public 
insurance programs described above settles the question. 
Yet it is not at all certain that even these arrangements are sufficient to 
69 The array of possible insurance, indemnification, and similar arrangements is limited 
only by the imagination of contract drafters, and the creation of mutual expected 
benefits associated with shifting risks from individuals to a larger community. The 
discussion in the text is a brief synopsis of the American experience described in M.G. 
Yudof 'Liability for Constitutional Torts and the Risk-Averse Public School Official' 
(1976) 49 So. Cal. LR 1322, at 1383-8. 
70 This arrangement appears to be typical of public institutions in the United States. See 
Monell v. New Yorh City Department of Social Sewices 436 us. 658, at 713 (1978)~ and 
'Suing the Police in Federal Court,' supra note 42, 785, 810 et seq. 
71 R.H. Kraakman makes this point persuasively in the context of private firms, but it 
seems to me that it is equally applicable to public bureaucracies. See 'Corporate Liability 
Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls' (1984) 93 Yale LJ 857. at 864-7. What is 
interesting about Kraakman's ideas is that they predict institutional liability only, unless 
personal liability adds substantially to our regulatory objectives. 
72 See Yudof, supra note 69, 1385. 
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overcome the skewed incentives. First, there is the uncertaintv associated 
with determining whether the particular activity associated with the loss 
comes within the insurance coverage. Moreover, it is possible that some 
risks may be ~ninsurable.~s More important, the costs associated with a 
lawsuit brought against an individual bureaucrat may include emotional 
trauma, employment disruptions, and associated non-monetary losses;74 
these wouldnot be covered by liability insurance, which indemnifies only 
for awards to plaintiffs. 
Insurance or  alternative risk-shifting arrangements may be less than 
optimal for other reasons. Vicarious liability or personal liability with 
insurance in all cases will result in the inappropriate shifting of losses to 
the state in the case of the 'rogue' bureaucrat, who, using the authority of 
her office, deliberately inflicts injury on a particular firm or individual for 
personal gain. Roncarelli v. Duplessis75 is perhaps the best known of these 
cases, but-corruption is not an entirely foreign idea in public bureaucra- 
cies. If a state official is insulated from liability under private risk-shifting 
arrangements even when she acted in her personal interest, we will be 
faced with a substantial risk of externalization of losses. 
For all these reasons, personal bureaucratic liability, whether or  not it is 
coupled with insurance,-does not appear to be a desirable starting-point in 
designing optimal government liability rules.76 The optimal liability 
regime, assuming that a liability regime is desirable at all, appears to be direct 
73 See R.J. Weddle 'Damages under S. 1983: Theschool Context' (1971) 46 Ind. LJ 52 1, at 
535, and Peoria v. Undmunter's at Lloyd's London, Unicorp 290 F. Supp. 890 (1968). It is 
against public policy, of course, to insure oneself against the consequences of a criminal 
act. The courts have broadly interpreted insurance policies, and the scope of negligent 
behaviour that can be insured against is wide. See Tinline v. White Cross Insurance 
Association [1921] 3 K B  327 (insured guilty of manslaughter in driving of motor vehicle 
held to be covered by policy); compare O'Hearn v. Yorkshire Insurance Co. (192 I )  51 OLR 
130 (Ont. CA) (insured who killed a man while driving drunk not indemnified for the 
criminal act). Under the Insurance Act, RSO 1980, c. 2 18, s. 95, a violation of criminal 
law no longer automatically renders unenforceable a claim for indemnity. The burden 
of proof is on the insurer to demonstrate that the acts were criminal, and the activity 
must be characterized as immoral. See American Auto Insurance Co. v. Dickson [1g43] SCR 
'43. 
74 'Suing the Police in Federal Court' supra note 42,809-1 1 ; Yudof, supra note 69,1390. 
75 [1g5g] SCR 121, 16 DLR (2d) 689. (Similar claims have been made in Gershman v. 
Manitoba Producers' Marketing Board (1976) 69 DLR (3d) I 14 (Man. CA)). By the term 
'rogue bureaucrat' I mean the bureaucrat who is motivated by personal greed and acts 
in such a way that no public benefit is associated with her action. 
76 It should be obvious by now that the arguments against personal bureacratic liability 
apply with nearly the same force to 'private' bureaucrats employed by large corpora- 
tions. While there is no fundamental difference between the two bureaucracies, there 
may be differential effects relating to the particular regulatory responsibilities of public 
bureaucrats, which should genereate positive obligations to benefit the public, and to 
the likelihood that performance-linked wage rates could be instituted in the public 
sector. 
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state liability. Under this model of liability a person injured as a result of 
state action77 would simply claim and obtain compensation from the state, 
leaving that institution to develop efficient responses in view of its 
exposure to accident risks. 
The abrogation of personal bureaucratic liability and its replacement 
with state liability raises subsidiary issues that must be resolved in order to 
predict its impact on government-generated accidents. In particular, we 
must choose between state liability based on the doctrine of respondeat 
superior in which personal bureaucratic liability remains a prerequisite to 
liability but is coupled with personal immunity or  a prohibition on a right 
to employer indemnifi~ation,7~ and direct state liability in which it is 
unnecessary to demonstrate a civil wrong committed by an individual 
bureaucrat. Leaving aside the advantages of either system from a 
compensation perspective, the direct state liability model appears, at first 
glance, to reduce litigation costs and thus to increase the likelihood that 
actions against the state will be cost-justified. T o  the extent that 
enforcement costs are reduced, resulting externalities are avoided. 
Furthermore, direct state liability reduces concerns with the exposure of 
state bureaucrats to the non-compensable risks of litigation,79 reduced the 
distortions associated with pro-defendant bias, and enables the tort 
system to deal with institutional wrongs. 
But a direct liability regime is not necessarily an effective method to 
regulate state accident-related activity. Its desirability depends on a'range 
of subsidiary issues. First, we must consider what it means to review the 
state: we will, it seems, be forced to determine which state actors will be 
considered to personify the state for the purposes of liability rules: to what 
extent is it possible to identify individuals, institutions, and activities 
whose conduct we can say is state conduct for the purposes of liability 
rules? Second, the decision to adopt a direct liability regime will rest, in 
part, on our assumptions regarding the current efficiency of state 
decision. Finally, the advantages of a direct liability regime will depend on 
the response of the state to the liability rules. (These issues are discussed 
later in this paper.) 
The final point in any proposal to adopt direct liability regime is to 
77 That idea must be qualified in two important ways. First, one still has to define 'state 
action,' which would exclude a wide range of redistributive activities that would be 
undercut by compensation mechanisms; taxes are the most obvious examples, but 
redistribution is achieved through a wide range of instruments. Second, one has to 
differentiate between state actors acting in their personal and official capacities. 
78 This is the model utilized by Posner in 'Rethinking the Fourth Amendment' supra note 
59. 
79 An excellent discussion of  the direct liability model of state liability is contained in 
Bermann, supra note 24, I 194-1 202. 
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consider whether it is appropriate to retain personal bureaucratic liability. 
The discussion of the adverse effects of personal liability suggests that the 
answer is no. Yet one might argue that if we adopt a system of enterprise 
liability, we must retain personal bureaucratic liability unless the state 
reacts to the liability rules in the same manner as a private firm. That is, if 
the state is not responding to liability rules, but is simply shifting them to 
the tax-paying public, then personal bureaucratic liability is the only 
effective regulatory tool we have. If the legal system cannot charge a price 
high enough to deter the state's injury-causing activity, there is at least an 
argument in favour of retaining personal liability.'" 
As I suggested earlier, a further problem with enterprise liability is the 
inappropriate shifting of losses to the state in the case of rogue 
bureaucrats." If we believe that these types of injuries are engaged in by a 
small number of bureaucrats who are not identifiable ex ante at a 
reasonable cost, and whose activities in this context are not easily 
monitored, personal bureaucratic liability with risk-shifting prohibited by 
law appears to be the optimal regime." However, the argument that we 
ought to retain personal liability in the case of bureaucrats who are 
motivated by personal gain is meaningful only if we impose personal 
liability coupled with subsidiary rules that prohibit loss-shifting to the 
state. For the reasons set out earlier that is unlikely, and in any case would 
generate substantial costs.'3 
11 The efficiency of state action 
THE EFFICIENT STATE 
Using tort law to generate economic signals and thus to provide incentives 
to the state to internalize losses suffered by private firms individuals 
necessarily involves an analysis of the efficiency of the bureaucratic 
decision associated with the loss. The economic rationale for loss 
internalization to private firms is that the production function of private 
firms will reflect only private costs. Thus, tort law is necessary to force the 
80 The point is made by Kraakman, supra note 7 1,876, who refers to this idea as 'sanction 
insufficiency.' He recognizes that if sanction insufficiency is the rationale for personal 
bureaucratic liability, then risk-shifting must be prohibited. 
81 See K. Kernaghan 'The Ethical Conduct of Public Servants' in K.M. Gibbons and D.C. 
Rowat (eds) Political Cormption in C a d  (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart 1976) at 
158, and A.A. Rogow and H.D. Laswell 'The Definition of Corruption' in A.J. 
Heidenheimer (ed.) Political Cormption (New York: Holt Rinehart Winston 1970) at 54. 
8 2  I admit that ex ante risk-shifting through contract wage modifications and similar 
means would be difficult to monitor. 
83 These costs would include the error costs in false positives, and the adverse incentive 
affects that risk would present to bureaucrats. 
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private firm to take into account social costs; if it does, its production 
decisions will be optimal. If one makes the heroic assumption that the 
state is currently taking into account all social costs, then it does not 
appear to be necessary to use tort law to internalize private 10sses.~4 One 
idea underlying government immunity is that, to some extent, the state 
will take into account the welfare of ~otential  victims of state action and 
that, when it does, judges cannot effectively review those decisions.'5 
Bureaucrats and bureaucratic institutions that operate according to this 
model will make decisions that maximize social welfare, and will make 
those decisions whether or not they are subject to tort liability.86 If the 
government is working 'perfectly,' then, as when markets are working 
perfectly, tort law is unnecessary from the point of view of efficiency 
analysis, and a 'no liability' rule is optimal. 
However, an assumption that government is motivated to achieve social 
allocative efficiency does not necessarily mean that we should never 
impose liability for losses associated with state action. Rather, it suggests 
that we ought to engage in a review process that investigates whether a 
particular bureaucratic decision, set of decisions, or  institutional structure 
accurately identifies a socially optimal choice and then implements the 
choice in an efficient manner. 1f we find that the government, though 
properly motivated, did not in fact achieve a potentially Pareto-optimal 
outcome, we ought to impose liability.87 This should be so even if the 
outcome was potentially Pareto-superior. In all cases, except for the 
Pareto-optimal decision, liability rules will have the effect of ensuring that 
the government takes into account all the costs associated with decisions 
that do not maximize social welfare.88 
84 In fact, if we were to d o  so, without more, we would run the risk of 'double-costing' the 
losses, with an associated under-production of the regulatory goods. 
85 See W.F. Baxter 'Enterprise Liability, Public and Private' (1978) 42 Law €9 Contmp.  
Prob. 45, at 50. 
86 See Spitzer, supra note 5, 525-6. 
87 It should be obvious that my analysis focuses only on non-redistributive decisions of the 
state. It is not that I deny either the reality or desirability of redistribution, but rather 
that I am assessing the allocative and not the distributive implications of liability rules. 
88 There are several reasons which suggest that we ought to impose liability unless the 
decision was Pareto-optimal. First, as long as the court is examining government action 
for efficiency, there seems no reason that Pareto-superiority should be the test, since 
Pareto-optimality maximizes rather than simply improves welfare. If Pareto-optimal 
choice can be determined in the particular case, the government should be induced to 
act in that fashion. 
Second, using a standard of Pareto-superiority could have devastating effects on 
equality and democracy. Pareto-superiority is value-blind in that as long as no person is 
worse off, it is irrelevant who is made better off. A standard of Pareto-superiority could 
allow for large variation in the relative wealth of groups, and exacerbate rather than 
mitigate distributional consequences. 
Third, a false misfeasance-nonfeasance distinction may arise here. The standard of 
Pareto-superiority might be taken to imply that the government should be liable to 
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THE INEFFICIENT STATE 
The inefficient state can be visualized in two ways. In the first (case I ) ,  
state institutions and bureaucrats are motivated to act efficiently but for 
one or more reasons fail to do so. In the other (case a ) ,  state institutions 
and bureaucrats are motivated to act inefficiently. The responses one 
develops to these two forms of inefficiency are significantly different.89 
One accepted rationale for government action holds that case 1 
inefficiency may be relatively common - that is, we assume that 
government failure represented by inefficient choices may occur even 
when bureaucrats are motivated to maximize aggregate social welfare. 
The problem that generates this type of government inefficiency is 
related to an inability to identify and quantify the demand for goods that 
exhibit 'shared indivisability.'gO The government often does not have 
enough information about who will benefit or  be injured as a result of 
state action, and similarly does not have information about the value those 
people place on the good or bad. As Mancur Olsen suggests, we do not 
have the analytical or  experimental techniques to identify the production 
function of the public good, its optimal quantity, the value the public 
places on it, and the possible substitutes that would be offered by 
alternative suppliers (governments).gl The courts, and perhaps other 
institutions, since they must live with the same paucity-of-information 
characteristics of public goods, seem unlikely to be capable of more 
accurate decisions that would have to be made in order to impose liability 
in such cases.9' 
those it has made worse off (misfeasance) but should not be liable if it has simply failed 
(that is, if it is simply guilty of nonfeasance) to maximize benefits to all groups, which 
would be the Pareto-optimal decision. This is a false distinction, in that if both 
Pareto-optimal and various Pareto-superior schemes can be deduced, the government 
should choose the Pareto-optimal. To  prefer a Pareto-superior scheme over a 
Pareto-optimal one is as much a positive choice act as any other. 
89 Efficient state action is represented by choices and actions that maximize the aggregate 
social welfare, while all other choices - whether they maximize bureaucratic, political, 
or any other sub-category of welfare - are inefficient. 
go These goods are those which, like national defence, transportation infrastructures, and 
information about government programs, can be distributed on an individual basis in 
quantities an individual can purchase and enjoy privately. When markets and prices do 
not operate efficiently, it is difficult to identify and value public demand for the good. 
g i  M. Olsen 'Official Liability and Its Less Legalistic Alternatives' (1978) 42 Law 6' 
Contemp. Prob. 67, at 73-5 
92 It is also true that such a review process would raise profound questions about 
democratic government. An implicit assumption in such a proposal is that the political 
will equals a desire that the government promote its definition of the public good. A 
different assumption is that the political will equals a desire that the government 
promote what the 'public' believes is the public good. If the second assumption is true, 
then a review institution would have to assess not only efficiency considerations but also 
the public's satisfaction with having its policy preferences implemented even if the 
public later regrets the choice. Perhaps one value of the state is the learning process 
engendered by its continual mistakes. 
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A second basis for assuming that even social welfare-maximizing 
bureaucrats may choose inefficiently is that bureaucrats may fail to take 
into account non-budgetary costs, or perhaps may discount non-budgetary 
costs more than they ought to. This phenomenon, referred to as 'fiscal 
illusion;' has been used to justify the adoption of liability rules that will 
transform social costs into budgetary costs in the case of expropriation 
and other state activities involving deliberate regulatory and distributive 
choices.93 Theories of public administration that treat bureaucracies as 
rational market participants suggest that planners will interpret data in 
such a manner as to maximize the probability that their departmental 
objectives will be achieved.94 More important, the socio-economic impact 
analysis currently employed in the federal bureaucracy does not include 
contingent risks of legal liability associated with state action as a regulatory 
risk.95 Moreover, bureaucracies may take into account and respond to a 
subset of costs imposed on  highly organized groups of victims as well as to 
highly focused costs.@ Given the random impact of tort losses, the costs of 
litigation, and the omission of contingent liability risks from social 
cost-benefit analysis, fiscal illusion may be a common source of govern- 
ment failure. If that is true, then, at least in theory, liability rules coupled 
with internal administrative processes that respond to liability risks may 
be an effective signalling device where losses are associated with ineffi- 
cient state actions of this sort.97 
Several writers who have developed models of efficient compensation 
rules have assumed that state action is efficient, or at least that bureaucrats 
are motivated to act efficiently.g8 There is considerable evidence, how- 
ever, to support a different assumption - that 'deliberate' government 
failure is as common as its more familiar private market economic 
counterpart.99 It is frequently argued that elected politicians, government 
93 See Kaplow, supra note 5, 567, and L. Blume and D.L. Rubinfeld 'Compensation for 
Takings: An Economic Analysis' (1984) 72 Col. LR  569, at 580. 
94 See J. Hirshleifer 'Comment on Peltzman' (1976) 19 J. of Law L9 Econ. 241. 
95 See Treasury Board of Canada Administrative Policy Manual Chapter 490 (Hull, PQ: 
Canadian Government Publishing Centre Dec. 1979) Appendix E (evaluation method- 
ologies), and G.B. Doern Rationalizing the Regulatory Decision-Making Process: The 
Prospects for Reform Working Paper no. 2, Economic Council of Canada, Regulation 
Reference (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada 1979) at 84-93. 
96 As Blume and Rubinfeld point out, the presence of fiscal illusion is likely to be 
associated with certain types of state action. To  the extent that the expected losses of a 
project are concentrated on an influential group of potential voters, we can expect less 
fiscal illusion (in terms of discounted costs) than in cases of highly dispersed losses: 
supra note 93, 622. 
97 As I point out in part v, however, more accurate and less costly signalling devices are 
available. 
98 See, for example, Blume and Rubinfeld, supra note 93,580. 
gg This is the point that is frequently overlooked in Ronald Coase's now famous article on 
the ability of private market arrangements to internalize social costs: supra note 2, 
17-18,27-8. 
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bureaucrats, and bureaucracies are 'non-maximizing,' and are motivated 
instead by self-interest - including an  interest in enhancing their personal 
wealth, professional stature and prestige, departmental size, power and 
budgets, and managerial discretion. lo" There is a great deal of evidence to 
suggest that bureaucratic decisions are influenced by personal motives of 
departmental aggrandizement, especially in cases where the department 
has substantial independence from superior bureaucracies.'"' If we 
assume that government, a particular government agency, a particular 
group of bureaucrats, o r  an  individual bureaucrat is motivated to benefit 
herself through decisions that increase her personal welfare, and that her 
personal welfare is independent of the welfare of potential victims of her activities, 
then, in theory, liability rules ought to be imposed.'"' 
Another set of arguments suggests that bureaucracies, like legislative 
institutions, are subject to majoritarian coercion and that this risk 
'undermines any assumption that outcomes are necessarily welfare- 
maximizing.""3 Thus, there is no reason to take as a starting-point the 
assertion that governments, like private economic actors, 'attempt to 
minimize overall costs.""4 I find it difficult to accept that majoritarian 
influence is a single explanation for bureaucratic action; it may be that 
pluralist democrats would rephrase the problem as the non-social 
welfare-maximizing functions of coalitions of minorities.1°5 Whatever the 
details might be, in the context of tort claims one might posit that the 
majority of individuals who are not tort victims will exercise their abilities 
to influence the bureaucracy to maximize their private welfare at the 
expense of those who suffer losses as a result of state action.'06 If that 
loo See W.A. Niskanen Jr  Bureaucracy and Representative Government (Chicago: Aldine 197 I )  
at 48, and J.-L. Migue and G. Belanger 'Towards a General Theory of Managerial 
Discretion' (1974) 17 Pub. Choice 27. 
101 See M. Olson TheLogic of CollectiveAction (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1965), 
and A. Downs Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown 1967). 
102 The same arguments apply in cases of government action that is motivated by a 
bureaucratic interest in maximizing the welfare of private interests. The only 
difference between the two is that in the latter the private welfare-maximizing agenda 
may have been approved by the electorate in some general sense, and thus is not so 
easily viewed with moral opprobrium. However, the critical variable - that government 
decisions will fail to take into account social costs - is present in both. 
103 Quinn and Trebilcock, supra note 2, 173; M.J. Trebilcock, D. Hartle, J.R.S. Prichard, 
and D.N. Dewees 'The Choice of Governing Instrument: Some Applications' Economic 
Council of Canada, Technical Report No. 12 (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada 
198 I)  at Chap. I. 
104 Spitzer, supra note 5,515 
105 See R.A. Dahl Who G o v m  (New Haven: Yale University Press 1961); R.A. Dahl, A 
Preface to Economic Democracy (Berkeley: University of California Press 1985) at 46. 
106 One might argue against this description of bureaucratic action, however. For 
example, if tort accidents are distributed randomly among the population, the majority 
will reflect the interests of potential tort victims, and thus, ex ante, will attempt to 
influence the bureaucracy to minimize their expected accident costs. 
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assumption is true, then liability rules should be employed in those cases 
to shift losses to the government.1°7 
We might also posit the existence of a set of bureaucrats who are 
characterized by abusive  motive^.'"^ In cases wherejudges have identified 
bureaucratic decisions motivated by private gain to inflict personal or 
economic injury on private citizens, they have imposed personal liability 
on the bureaucrat for the tort of intimidation or  abuse of office.lOg 
Similarly, legislative provisions affording tort immunity to bureaucrats 
commonly do not apply to actions taken in 'bad faith."'" These bureau- 
crats or bureaucracies, if they exist, ought to be subject to liability rules 
that force them to take into account the losses associated with their 
malevolent acts. l 1  
This suggestion is subject to three caveats. First, it assumes that we can 
distinguish between malevolent bureaucrats and others at a cost that is less 
than the aggregate benefit associated with the loss internalization. 
Second, in so far as we permit insurance against merely inefficient 
bureaucratic actions, we must be able to deny insurance to bureaucrats in 
respect of malevolent decisions. This will generate administrative costs 
either ex ante or ex post, and we will have to pay for 'false positives' 
represented by the residual risks faced by individual bureaucrats who 
may be incorrectly labelled malevolent. Finally, if we do shift this loss to 
the state as an institution, the benefits associated with that loss-shifting 
must be closely evaluated. Rogue bureaucrats are difficult to identify ex 
ante, and it is difficult to think of institutional responses that will 
effectively reduce the risks to the public associated with their actions. 
If one assumes inefficient state action in both case 1 and case 2 ,  it can be 
argued that liability rules are an appropriate regulatory tool. None the 
less, even under that assumption we would not necessarily choose to 
design liability rules based on models employed in the private sector. In 
assessing the desirability of liability rules we are concerned with their net 
marginal benefits, and we must take account of the response of the 
government to potential and actual liability risks, given that the govern- 
ment is not constrained by competitive capital or  product markets. 
107 This argument is subject to the analysis in part 4. 
108 This is Spitzer's 'malevolent entity' supra note 5, 534-6. 
109 See Rontarelli v. Duphssis, supra note 75, 143 (SCR); Takaro Properties Ltd v. Rowling 
[1g76] 2 NZLR 657, at 662-4 (sc); Trobridge v. Hardy (1955) 94 CLR 147 (HC); and 
Gershman v. Manitoba Vegetable Producers' Marketing Board supra note 75. It should be 
noted that in Gershman the board rather than the individual bureaucrat was identified 
as the malevolent entity. 
I I O  See, for example, Trade Practice Act, RSBC 1979, c. 406, s. 16(1); The Summary 
Offences Procedure Act, ~ s s  1978, c. s-63, s. 7; and Liquor Control Act, RSA 1980, C. 
L-'77 S. 77(4). 
1 i 1 It is implicit in this analysis that I do not view the welfare gains to the rogue bureaucrat 
as contributing to the aggregate welfare of society. 
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III The net margznal benefits of liability rules 
Simply to say that government failure may be an explanation for 
non-optimal (inefficient) decisions does not necessarily lead to the 
conclusion that we should review state action by using liability rules. It is 
obvious that the only relevant benefits of liability rules are those net 
marginal benefits that would be generated in addition to the loss- 
internalization associated with existing or alternative legal, regulatory, 
and political instruments. That is, in assessing the desirability of imposing 
liability rules on government, we must be cognizant of the costs associated 
with the review mechanism, and of alternative regulatory instruments 
whose actual or potential existence reduces the benefits associated with 
implementing a government liability regime. 
THE COSTS OF LIABILITY RULES 
Even a cursory analysis of the review process associated with liability rules 
reveals how complex and intractable it will be.'" I argued earlier that if 
one is concerned with the internalization of social costs, liability rules are 
appropriate only in cases of inefficient state action.113 The evidence we 
have so far suggests that courts are aware of their limited institutional 
competence to determine whether state actions are allocatively efficient. 
The review would necessarily involve either replacing the political- 
bureaucratic definition of the social welfare function, or evaluating 
whether the bureaucracy achieved the outcome that definition would 
have called for. In theory, direct state liability involves the review of 
legislative and senior executive decisions by the courts (assuming that 
curial institutions are retained in the review process). Not surprisingly, 
judges have traditionally denied their authority to review the legislative 
and senior executive institutions of the state,' '4 and the federal legislation 
112 For example,-there has been considerable debate in the United States about the 
appropriate role of the courts in evaluating cost-benefit analyses carried out by 
administrative agencies. Judge David Bazelon suggests that the courts defer to 
administrative expertise in reviewing agency cost-benefit analyses. See D. Bazelon 
'Coping with Technology through the Legal Process,' cited in M.S. Baram 'Cost-Benefit 
Analysis: An Inadequate Basis for Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulatory 
Decision Making' (1980) 8 Ecology L 4 4 7 3 ,  at 476. Compare H. Leventhal 'Environmen- 
tal Decision-Making and the Role of the Courts' (1974) 1 2 2  U. Pa. LR 509, at 555. 
I I 3  'Inefficient state action' refers to the activities of public bureaucrats that fail advertently 
or inadvertently, to take into account their full social costs. This definition ignores the 
redistributive role of most modern governments. 
114 In the case of provincial and federal governments the issue has arisen in the review of 
Crown prerogatives, and in attempts by victims of state action to argue that the cabinet 
or particular ministers are Crown servants for the purposes of vicarious liability under 
the relevant Crown liability legislation. These cases are not precisely on point, since in 
the first executive action is reviewed, while in the second individual conduct is reviewed 
and the imposition of vicarious liability on the state is urged. None the less, they are 
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providing for tort liability in limited circumstances specifically excludes 
liability for losses associated with the exercise of executive prerogatives. ' ' 5  
Even if we could restrain the review institution from applying its own 
definition of the social welfare-maximizing choices, it would still have to 
determine the potential outcome of the bureaucratic welfare-maximizing 
choice, compare it with the actual outcome (keeping all other variables 
constant), and award damages representing the difference. Leaving aside 
the administrative costs of identifying the 'victims' and distributing the 
damage award, the determination of the two critical elements of the 
equation - the outcome of the potentially Pareto-optimal choice, and the 
outcome of the choice that was made - would generate enormous costs, 
and would be characterized by substantial error costs in the current or any 
imaginable review process. 
The review process would not be significantly simplified, nor would its 
accuracy be improved, if we were to relax the requirement of potential 
Pareto-optimality and simply demand that governments motivated to act 
efficiently pay damages when their decisions were not potentially 
Pareto-superior. One might assume, for the sake of argument, that 
governments motivated to act efficiently should act only after engaging in 
a social cost-benefit analysis of the proposed choice, and that action is 
taken only when the expected benefits of the action exceed its expected 
c o ~ t s . ' ' ~  If a person were less well off as a result of government action 
close approximations of the review process we could expect if a direct liability regime 
were established in these jurisdictions. 
In the case of Crown prerogatives, the courts have refused to engage in substantive 
review except on constitutional grounds. See S.A. De Smith Constitutional and 
Administrative Law 4th ed. (Harmondsworth: Penguin 198 I )  at 137, and Attorney General 
v. Nissan [1g70] AC 179. 
In the case of ministers, the courts have said that ministers are not officers or servants 
of the Crown. See McArthur v. R. [1g34-4] EX. CR 77, Belleau v. Minitter of National 
Health and Welfare [1g48] Ex. CR 288, [1g48] 2 DLR 632, and Mavorv.  TheKing (1919) 19 
EX. CR 304, 51 DLR 145. 
I 15 See Crown Liability Act, RSC 1970, C. c-38, s. 3(6) I do not know if there is an easy 
answer to the problem, but it does not seem possible to design an 'efficiency review 
institution,' keeping in mind that allocative efficiency will incorporate distributive 
choices. What might be possible is the application of enterprise liability to the state by a 
non-judicial review institution, which will overcome the concerns about separation of 
powers and institutional competence that generate judicial reticence when judges are 
asked to review the decisions of cabinet and other senior bureaucracies. For reasons I 
give later, I do not believe that even this proposal is justified. 
116 While many would argue that the regulatory state ought to be governed by that 
directive, it is both naive and optimistic to think that government policy is a product of 
that exercise. None the less, in December 1979 the federal Treasury Board announced 
a new policy governing all major new regulations or amendments of existing 
regulations relating to health, safety, or  fairness. Under chapter 490 of the Adminirtra- 
tive Policy Manual, all such regulations must be subjected to a socio-economic impact 
analysis. The risk or cost aspect of the analysis represents an attempt to ascertain the 
resources used in producing government benefits. The government department is 
Heinonline - -  40 U. Toronto L.J. 238 1990 
REGULATING REGULATORS 239 
taken after the impact analysis, it would be possible, in theory, to review 
the analysis to determine whether it was carried out correctly. If the 
reviewing institution determined that the state action should not have 
been carried out in view of its assessment of the expected costs and 
benefits of the choice that was made, compensation would be paid to the 
victim. The difficulty with this model of tort law is that the review of the 
social cost-benefit analyses carried out by the government is dramatically 
different from the review of analogous decisions in the private sector.117 
For example, many current models of social cost-benefit analysis 
expressly mandate an assessment of the impact of a proposed regulation 
on such variable as income distribution and regional balance, technologi- 
cal progress, market structure and competition, balance of payments, 
international competitiveness, energy consumption, and inflation.''* T o  
the extent that these factors are integrated into the decision-making 
process, it is impossible to review them unless we are willing to accept the 
reviewing institution as a super-government. Further, it is often necessary 
to value human lives and suffering, and the distributional consequences 
of state action, in determining the desirability of government activity. The 
arguments about the appropriate figures to use in such cases, and indeed 
the appropriate methodology to be used, do not seem to me to be capable 
of resolution in a review forum. Moreover, the costs associated with 
redoing the social cost-benefit analysis using non-experts would be 
likely to be aware of its accounting budget, involving direct government expenditures 
on administration, implementation, and policing. The assessment of government 
action must involve a determination of the economic budget associated with a particular 
policy, which will encompass all private and public costs. See A. Breton and R. Wintrobe 
The Logic of Bureaucratic Conduct (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1982) 20-2. 
117 I should point out that implicit in this argument is an assumption that the use of a 
common law tort negligence standard to review government liability is inappropriate. 
It is obvious that efficiency has a larger scope that negligence, which, as conventionally 
defined, does not look to all the factors that collectively determine efficiency. 
A second point implicit in my argument is whether the government should be made 
to adhere to a negligence standard, or to an economic efficiency standard if those two 
ideas are not coincident. For example, should the government be liable if it ignores 
accepted economic expertise in reaching its decision - that is, when it chooses to ignore 
the easily predictable effects of an admittedly political decision? Or should it be liable 
only for damages caused through the negligent administration of a policy? The 
electorate itself may be said to be acting negligently with regard to economic 
information. Should the government be allowed to act inefficiently, and knowingly so, 
when possessed of the broad support of the electorate? Here I think the answer must be 
yes. If not, democracy would be reduced to the rubber-stamping of policies endorsed 
by the economically reasonable man. We must recognize the importance of separating 
policy decisions (and the inefficiencies they impose on administrative decision-making) 
from inefficient administrative decisions for which the state should be held liable when 
the decisions are made independent of a policy decision. 
118 See Treasury Board Canada, Administrative Policy Manual, supra note 95, chapter 490, 
at section 3.1.2 and Appendix E at 14-18. See also F. Thompson and L.R. Jones 
R e p l a t o y  Policy and Practices (New York: Praeger 1982) 152-74. 
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substantial. Even identifying the resources expended in the private sector 
in response to the public activity, and valuing those resources (a necessary 
element in a socio-economic impact analysis) would generate significant 
C O S ~ S . " ~  
The review process, even when it is applied to less formal instances of 
government decision-making, is no simpler to design and implement. For 
instance, one might imagine a decision of the police to dispense with 
special protection for a young woman who notifies them of a suspected 
assault by a spurned boy-friend. Carried out properly, this choice would 
involve trade-offs between the marginal cost of overtime pay for extra 
police protection in view of the expected benefits of providing the service, 
and existing demands on the allocation of limited police resources to 
crime detection, traffic control, public education, and other requests for 
special protection."" Unless we can value the demand for these goods, 
ascertain the costs of supplying them, and determine whether we should 
have substituted the complainant's good for the good that was produced, 
we cannot determine whether the decision was inefficient or  efficient. 
Thus, if one assumes that the government is motivated to maximize social 
welfare, it does not seem feasible to establish a comprehensive review 
process that could effectively review the decisions of the government to 
determine whether the choices generated efficient outcomes.'" 
i 19 This, of course, is the explanation for the development of doctrinal rules that attempt 
to distinguish 'policy-making' and the choice of government objectives from 'imple- 
mentation' and execution of the policy. One of the first indications that the courts 
would immunize the former from judicial review in compensation claims was Anns v. 
Merton London Borough Council [1g78] AC 728. I have criticized the development of this 
'discretionary' exemption, as it is sometimes called, not only for its indeterminacy but 
also for its nai'vety in assuming a hierarchical structure and a formal discontinuity 
between stages in the design and production of regulatory goods. See D. Cohen 'The 
Public and Private Law Dimensions of the UFFI Problem'(1983-4) 8 Can. B w .  LJ4 10. In 
recent decisions courts in Australia and England have rejected this aspect of Anns and 
replaced it with an equally abstruse concept. See, for example, Governors of the Peabody 
Donation Fund v. Sir Lindray Parkinson and Co. Ltd [ I  9851 I AC 2 lo. 
120  See RiFs v. City o f N m  York 240 N E  2d 860 (1g68), and Bass v. City of New York 330 N Y S  2d 
569 (1972)~ affd 300 NE 2d 154 (1973) (no liability on housing authority for failure 
adequately to protect physical safety of young girl assaulted on authority property). See 
also K.C. Davis Discretiona~Jurtice (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press 
1969) 80-8, 162-9. 
I 2 I One possible solution to the problem of determining whether government action is 
efficient would be to adopt a strict liability rule in which the only relevant criterion for 
compensation would be a demonstration of a sufficient causal relationship between 
government action (or inaction) and the claimants' losses. I do not mean to 
underestimate the difficulties associated with reaching conclusions about causal 
relations. And no one can possibly believe that mono-causality is operating in the case of 
state wrongs. 
None the less, strict liability would reduce, though it would not avoid, the 
administrative costs of determining inefficient state action, and would shift the 
efficiency determination to the state. Under certain assumptions (which might not hold 
true in a significant number of cases), the state would respond by adopting efficient 
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THE MARGINAL BENEFITS OF LIABILITY RULES 
In the case of private torts, liability rules operate and should be evaluated 
in the context of the market as a regulatory tool. If the market is working 
perfe~tly,'~' tort law is unnecessary if all one cares about is primary 
accident-cost avoidance. Similarly, in the case of public torts, liability rules 
operate in the context of the political market as a regulatory tool. The 
political market, however, is not examined and evaluated easily, and it 
may not operate in the same fashion across the bureaucracy."3 
Yet the political market in its various guises may justify state and 
bureaucratic immunity if it is operating effectively as a cost-internalization 
mechanism. For example, it has been argued that it is unnecessary to 
impose liability on some bureaucrats since they are subject to parliamenta- 
ry ac~ountability."~ It has also been suggested that it is unnecessary to 
provide damage actions against some elected officials in view of their 
regulation by electoral markets."5 Although there have been isolated 
instances of legislative compensation in the case of mass tort victimiza- 
tion'16 and banking failures,"7 the transaction costs of legislative action 
suggest that it is a highly imperfect alternative to liability rules. Whether 
parliamentary review takes place ex ante through ongoing reporting and 
accident-reduction measures and shifting residual costs to its constituents. While this 
might be attractive in some instances of state action, the proposal implicitly assumes 
that the state is not taking those losses into account ex ante. Thus it solves the problem, 
but only after rejecting the assumption that led to the problem in the first place. 
There may be persuasive reasons to implement 'no-fault' loss-compensation pro- 
grams in respect of certain state activities. See Schuck, supra note 57, I 12-13. But if 
one assumes that the government is taking into account social costs, strict liability would 
not be the optimal liability rule. 
122 That is, where there are no transaction or enforcement costs, all losses, victims, and 
injurers are identifiable immediately and at no cost, and all losses are shifted 
immediately and at no cost. 
I 23 Perhaps the most significant aspect of at least some aspects of the political market is that 
it operates in secret, making it next to impossible to evaluate its effectiveness. As well, 
some bureaucracies, including the judiciary and prosecutorial officers, are valuable 
precisley because of their relative independence from direct political influence. 
124 A dramatic example of this argument was Justice Powell's suggestion that the possibility 
of impeachment was evidence of the historical immunity of President Nixon. See 
Fitzgeraldv. Niron supra note 66,2705. See also W. Gourlie 'Role of the Prosecutor: Fair 
Minister of Justice with Firm Convictions' (1982) 16 UBCLR 395, at 300. 
I 25 See Fitzgwald v. Nixon supra note 66, 2705-6. 
126 Possibly the most famous example of legislative review giving rise to compensation is In 
re Texas City DtFaFter Litigation (a District Court awarded judgment to plaintiffs; a Court 
of Appeal reversed, 197 F. 2d 771; affirmed sub no. Dalehite v. United States 346 U.S. 15 
(1953)), where Congress awarded up to $25,000 per claimant for losses arising out of 
the explosion of fertilizer with an ammonium nitrate base at Texas City, Texas, in April 
1947. See Texas City, Texas Disaster Claims, PL 378, stat. 707 (1955). The American 
Supreme Court had denied compensation under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 u s c ,  
ss. 1346, 2671-8, and 2680. See also A.W. Reitze 'Federal Compensation for 
Vaccination Induced Injuries' ( I  986) I 3 Boston Coll. Env. Aff. LR I 69. 
127 Financial Intitution DepositorsCompensation Act, sc 1986, introduced in the House of 
Commons on 7 October I 985 
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budgetary review, or ex post through reporting in the Public Accounts, it 
is fair to say that political review of discretionary powers is weaker than 
review of other aspects of administrative behaviour.""n the light of the 
random impact of tort victimization and in the absence of an organized 
political focus for tort victims, that intuition seems to be justified. Again 
empirical data are unavailable to support this assessment."g 
A second potential regulatory instrument is judicial review in its 
traditional administrative guise. But again, most investigators of the 
administrative process have concluded that judicial review is not an 
effective regulatory to01.'~" Even if it were, judicial review resulting in 
bureaucratic decisions being declared unenforceable does not result in 
loss-shifting. '3' 
A third 'political' accountability mechanism may be professional norms 
of conduct - the values and attitudes that are internalized as part of 
bureaucratic training and experience.13' It may be true that this is the 
most powerful control mechanism; it has the additional benefit of being 
self-enforcing. Where the bureaucratic process is characterized by 
professional norms, the necessity ofjudicial regulation through tort law is 
questionable, since behaviour is shaped and modified by internalized 
norms of conduct. The internal regulatory methods by which subordi- 
nates are controlled by superiors take the form of formal rules that 
support the professional norms; they represent hierarchical control within 
128 F. Slatter Parliament and Administrative Agencies working paper (Ottawa: Law Reform 
Commission of Canada I 982) 38-4 1, I 14 
izg It should be noted that critics of parliamentary accountability accept its theoretical 
possibility but argue that as a practical matter street-level bureaucrats operate in a 
manner which necessarily means that they are unconstrained by legislative review. See 
Law Society of Upper Canada Report on the Abwe of Power and the Role of an  Independent 
Judicial System in its Regulation and Control (Toronto: De Boo 1979) at 61 I .  
130 This is especially so in the case of those bureaucrats whose decision-making has been 
declared unreviewable by the courts. Again, prosecutorial discretion comes within this 
class. See Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers [ig78] AC 435; Nelles v. Ontario, supra 
note 66. Moreover, cases such as R. v. Rourke (1977) 38 CRNS 268,35 ccc (nd) I 29 (scc) 
suggest that Canadian judges are reluctant to review certain bureaucratic decisions 
except in the most egregious circumstances. It is true that since Rourke Canadianjudges 
have engaged in judicial review of prosecutorial decisions, but notwithstanding John 
Edwards' confidence that this is an effective regulatory tool, it seems thatjudges are still 
hesitant to impose sanctions on bureaucrats, at least in this context. See J.LI.J. Edwards 
The Attorney General, Politics and the Public Interest (London: Sweet and Maxwell I 984) at 
120. 
131 See Bosadu v. Pinos (1984) 5 DLR (4th) 334, at 338 (Ont. HC). 
132 This point has been made by both supporters and critics of bureaucratic immunity. See 
K. Turner 'The Role of Crown Counsel in Canadian Prosecutions' (1962) 40 Can. Bar 
Rev. 439; Boucher v. The Queen (1954) 110 ccc 263, at 270 (scc), per Rand J ,  who 
described the public duty of Crown prosecutors. One can compare these remarks with 
those of Mark Tushnet in 'The Constitution of the Bureaucratic State' ( I  984) 86 W. Va. 
LR 1077. 
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the agency through rules and norms and an alternative to control by 
external agencies.'33 Paradigmatic cases include public prosecutorial 
decision-making, judging, and law enforcement investigation. In these 
cases bureaucratic incentives are professional rather than economic, and 
the norms that establish and define what prosecutors, police, and judges 
ought to do are internalized through training and institutional con- 
straints. If this is so, then damage awards against the state are unlikely to 
influence bureaucratic behaviour. 
Yet professional norms might not coincide with efficient loss-reducing 
decisions. For example, in the case of 'prosecutor-bureaucrats' a relevant 
norm might be the win-loss ratio of the individual prosecutor.lS4 There is 
no reason to believe that this necessarily coincides or is even directly 
related to a socially optimal decision criterion, and there is the risk that 
prosecutorial decisions constrained by professional norms of conduct will 
lead to decisions to prosecute individuals whom the bureaucrat thinks she 
will be able to convict, rather than individuals 'ought' to be prosecuted.'35 
Even this cursory review of the current 'political' markets that might be 
operating to internalize social costs suggests that they do not work 
'perfectly.' None the less, to the extent that they do, we focus on the 
marginal benefits associated with state liability, and should hesitate to 
impose liability without a thorough analysis of the costs and benefits of 
existing and alternative accountability mechanisms. 
IV Responses of the state to liability rules 
In part I I described the arguments against the imposition of personal 
bureaucratic liability, and suggested tentatively that direct state liability 
might be the preferred regulatory instrument when the objective is to 
reduce the incidence and consequences of state-caused losses. In part 11 I 
argued that such a proposal is attractive only when one assumes 
133 Tushnet, supra, 1095-6. The bureaucratic process is neither utilitarian nor contractar- 
ian, but is characterized by 'decisions [made] in light of profesisonal norms.' 
134 See B.A. Grossman 'Conflict and Compromise in the Criminal Courts: New Directions 
in Legal Research' (1968) I i Crim. LQ 292, at 294. 
135 R.H. Jackson makes this point in 'The Federal Prosecutor' (1940) 24 J. of Adm. Jud. Soc. 
18, at 19. It is true that nothing is wrong per se with decisions to prosecute that are 
based on the probability of convictions. None the less, other variables, including the 
likelihood of future criminal activity and the attitude of the public to the crime and to 
convictions, are ignored in the calculus. 
The problem is one of conflicting incentives. The prosecutor may react to internal 
departmental budgetary and administrative signals that demand productivity, and not 
to the invisible signals from the victims of those decisions - persons who ought not to 
have been prosecuted in view of the social benefits associated with their incarceration, 
and persons who are victims of criminals who ought to have been prosecuted. 
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inefficient state action. In part 111 I argued that even in cases of inefficient 
state action, liability rules may be undesirable in view of their costs and the 
existing legal regulatory instruments. Here I argue that even in the case 
of inefficient state action, liability rules may be undesirable given the 
ability of the state to 'externalize' losses across taxpayers. 
Richard Posner is the strongest proponent of the application of tort law 
to state action; he recommends the use of liability rules to regulate 
government action in a number of contexts.'37 Posner suggests that 
traditional doctrines intended to influence bureaucratic behaviour in the 
context of law enforcement activities - including the entrapment defence 
and the exclusionary rule - are themselves inefficient, and ought to be 
replaced by tort damage actions against the government.'" It is not easy to 
dismiss the claim that non-monetary remedies are inefficient. Such 
remedies generate the dead-weight losses associated with the imposition 
of sanctions which reduce social welfare without an associated gain in 
deterrence,'39 and which may over-deter the regulated conduct.'4" 
None the less, the critical assumption behind such recommendations is 
that the government reacts to liability rules as a private economic actor 
would. In  contrast, a 'no liability' rule is optima114' when one assumes that 
the government and bureaucratic agencies will not react to economic 
incentives. That is, only if one assumes that the state, like a private firm, is 
constrained by relatively efficient markets in labour, products and capital 
can one predict that the state will react to liability risks by adopting 
efficient accident-reduction measures.'4' 
136 Of course, all of this assumes that the only relevant state objective is to engage in the 
efficient delivery of regulatory benefits. We can certainly justify liability rules when we 
want to achieve other objectives - recognizing and protecting 'rights,' providing for 
loss-spreading engaging in public insurance programs, and so on. 
137 See Posner 'Rethinking the Fourth Amendment' supra note 59 and Posner 'Excessive 
Sanctions' ibid. 635-6, and C. Foote 'Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual 
Rights' (1955) 39 Minn. LR 493. 
138 Although Posner recognizes the problems associated with personal bureacratic liability, 
his suggestion of government liability on the basis of respondeat superior doctrines 
without rights of indemnification assumes that the threat of liability would give the 
agency 'an incentive to prevent misconduct by its officers': 'Excessive Sanctions' supra 
note 59, 64 I .  
139 G.S. Becker 'Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach' (1968) 76 J .  of Pol. Econ. 
169; R.A. Posner 'Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals' (1980) 17 Am. Crim. 
LR  409, at 4 10. 
140 The inefficiency of over-deterrence is represented by the opportunity costs of the 
regulatory benefits that are not produced as a result of bureaucratic inaction: Posner 
'Excessive Sanctions' supra note 59,637. See also United States v. United States Gypsum Co. 
438 us. 422, at 440-3 (1978). 
141 See Posner, 'Rethinking the Fourth Amendment' supra note 59, 66. 
142 See D.N. Dewees 'Regulating Environmental Quality' in D.N. Dewees (ed.) The 
Regulation of Quulity: Products, Services, Workplaces, and the Environment (Toronto: 
Butterworths 1983) 153; W..J. Baumol and W.E. Oates Economics, Environmental Policy, 
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THE IMPACT OF DAMAGE CLAIMS AGAINST THE STATE 
In theory, internal accident-reduction measures are a likely response to 
liability rules applied by an exogenous review institution.'43 Risk manage- 
ment would involve superior agencies' assuming responsibility for 
detecting, identifying, and controlling the risk-increasing activities in 
which its subordinate departments and employees engage. Accident costs 
would be minimized to the extent that efficient risk-management 
measures could be designed and implemented, and insurance arrange- 
ments would be implemented to spread losses over time and large 
numbers of insured parties.'44 Moreover, because judges would not 
directly regulate agency policy or  implementation, there would be a 
reduced risk that the judiciary would find itself running government 
programs. '45 
Government responses to accident risks would conceivably include an 
internal system of administrative di~cipl ine '4~ and the adoption of 
decision-making structures sensitive to the expected accident costs of state 
action.'47 Governments faced with liability risks could be expected to 
and the Quality ofLife (Englewood Cliffs, N J :  Prentice-Hall 1979); and A. Alchian and H. 
Demsetz 'Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization' (1972) 62 Am. 
Econ. Rev. 77. 
143 At the very least one would avoid the administrative costs associated with teaching 
judges how they might reform the bureaucratic process to minimize the expected costs 
of government action, and it is a fair assumption that the senior bureaucrats will get it 
right more often than judges, even after that educative process. 
There seems to be very little empirical data describing the response of bureaucracies 
to liabilty risks. A review of Canadian Public Policy up to 1985, Canadian Public 
Administration to the spring of 1986, the Jounull of Political Economy from 1965 to 1985, 
and the J o u m l  of Public Economics from 1965 to 1985 uncovered no relevant material. 
Two articles on municipal risk management were anecdotal rather than theoretical or 
empirical: see R. Breber 'Are Risk Managers Needed in Cities?' (1985) 67 Public 
Management 7, and 'Risk Management' (1978) 60 Public Management. 
A special issue of Public Administration Review was devoted to government liability, but 
the articles on tort losses were not particularly useful. See (1985) 45 Public Administra- 
tion Review 742. 
144 It would be highly unusual for central governments to obtain market insurance in 
respect of regulatory risks; the ability of the insurer to predict and evaluate the risks, 
and to pool and spread the losses, probably would be inferior to the insured's. 
However, governments whose tax base and authority are constrained may very well 
obtain market insurance in respect of 'non-governmental' risks. See, for example, Risk 
Retention Act, 15 usc, ss. 390 1 et seq., as amended. Congressional amendments in 1986 
provided in s. 3goi(a)(s)(~)(ii) for the extension of risk-retention benefits to all state 
and local government activities. 
145 As Peter Schuck notes, it is unlikely that courts, or  indeed any institution that designs 
and implements tort remedies, could be sensitive to the demands of the immense range 
of functions in which the government is engaged, design effective deterrent mecha- 
nisms suited to those contexts, and implement and monitor them at the street level: ' 
supra note 57, 103. 
146 See Bermann, supra note 24, 1202. 
147 Michael Trebilcock and Douglas Hartle develop this idea in the context of regulatory 
costs in 'Regulatory Reform and the Political Process' (1982) 2 0  Osgoode Hall LJ 643. 
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implement risk management measures to monitor and identify potential 
exposure and to reduce the probability and magnitude of expected losses 
through internal management decision~. '4~ These responses might in- 
volve improved training and employee selection programs, and the 
adoption of remuneration practices linking accident costs to salaries and 
However, analyses of damage claims against the federal government 
over recent years and of the budgetary and payment mechanisms within 
the federal government suggest that the state cannot be assimilated to the 
position of a private firm. The  current internal administrative systems 
bperating at the federal level of government supports the view that the 
response of the government to legal liability risks will not generate a 
reduction in accident costs. The  incentive effect of potential or actual 
legal liability on a particular department should depend, to a considerable 
148 Current risk management procedures in use in federal bureaucracies are described in 
chapters 320,53o,j31, and 532 of the Treasuly Board Manual. In chapter 320 (entitled 
'Risk Management') government departments are directed to record information 
relating to the number, type, and dollar value of harmful or damagingoccurrences; the 
annual number of claims by type and location; security infractions by type and location; 
and the annual dollar value of any insurance purchases. Risks to government assets and 
risks to government personnel are dealt with in chapter 530 ("Management of Risk - 
Generally'). In identifying risks, departments are directed to assess damaging agents, 
including human and physical factors, and to distinguish between risks peculiar to 
government and general risks. Departments are then directed to engage in risk- 
minimization efforts, including risk avoidance, options designed to minimize the 
financial consequences of accidents, and special employment practices, including 
safety, prevention, and training. Chapter 530 also provides directions on loss 
containment and the avoidance of fire risks through compliance with standards. 
Chapter 53 I ("Management of Risk - Underwriting') describes government insurance 
practices. Fire and automobile risks are self-insured. Exceptions to this self-insurance 
presumption include cars at foreign posts and steam boilers. The government does not 
maintain a fund dedicated to underwriting risks, and funding is generally the direct 
responsibility of the individual department which generates the accident. There is 
interim financing available to a department if extreme financial difficulty arises, but 
advances received are expected to be repaid through supplementary or future 
appropriations. Chapter 532 ("Management of Risk CompensationlRestoration') 
describes claims investigation procedures. Restoration and compensation for intrade- 
partmental incidents are delegated to the department. When a major incident occurs 
between departments, the Treasury Board considers departmental submissions, and 
when disputes arise it obtains opinions from the Department of Justice. Claims 
regulations are followed for tort claims, with the exception of defalcation by public 
officials. 
149 See M.J. Jaron 'The Threat of Personal Liability under the Federal Civil Rights Act: 
Does It Interfere with the Performance of State and Local Government?'(lg8 I )  13 Urb. 
Lauyer I ,  at 21-2. F. Heffron and N. McFeeley The Adminirtrative Regulatory Process 
(New York: Longman 1983) at 331; Newman 'Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to 
Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct' (1978) 
87 Yale LJ 447, at 457; and P.C. Weiler 'The Control of Police Arrest Practices: 
Reflections of a Tort Lawyer' in A. Linden (ed.) Studies in Canadian Tort Law (Toronto: 
Butterworths 1968) at 445-6. 
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degree, on the proportional impact of the costs of legal liability on the 
department's operating budget. Actual legal exposure (not including the 
costs of legal work) never exceeds 0.2 per cent (11500) of a departmental 
budget. '5"see the accompanying table.) 
Furthermore, in departments where liability approaches that percent- 
age, most of the liability costs represent property and automobile damage 
claims.'5' There is no reason to believe that government employees drive 
more negligently than employees of private firms, and it does not appear 
that the costs of accidents are a result of government inefficiency.'5* For 
several departments with relatively large-legal costs, this type of liability 
(damage claims for vehicle accidents) is one in which the incentive effect 
of financial costs on accidents is notoriously difficult to determine, and is 
indeed the object of much scepticism.'53 Thus, it seems reasonable for the 
department to view these costs as an operating cost and not to treat them 
as a tort liability amenable to risk-management procedures peculiar to 
government. 
In any case, the data suggest that legal liability costs are probably not of 
- - 
major concern to any particular department in determining its budgetary 
estimates. Those estimates are never resolved within 1 per cent at the start 
of the fiscal year.'54 Further, the cost of legal liability as a category of 
expenditure is never distinctly considered,'55 but is assumed in current 
departmental budgets as a component of general operating costs. It is 
I 50 The table was compiled from Receiver General for Canada Public Accounts of Canada, 
1983-1984 and Public Accounts of Canada, 1984-1985 (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and 
Services 1984, 1985). Details of damage claims, ex gratia payments, and Federal Court 
awards are in section 33 of vol. 2 of both years. Annual budgetary appropriations 
(non-statutory) are listed by department in table 2 of the introduction to vol. 2 of both 
years. 
151 In the case of the Departments of National Defence and Transport, automobile 
accidents predominate. Property damage and automobile accidents represent the vast 
majority of claims involving the RCMP in the Department of the Solicitor General. 
152 A comparison of the number of accidents per miles driven between private firms and 
the government would be required to demonstrate inefficiency. Since the government 
is a self-insurer, there is no independent assessment of accident claims by which to 
assess premium rates. 
153 See M.A. Franklin 'Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective 
Reimbursement' (1967) 53 Va. LR 774. 
154 D.G. Hartle The Expenditure Budget Process in the Government of Canada (Toronto: 
Canadian Tax Foundation 1978) 40; Public Accounts supra note 150, VOI. I ,  section 4, 
table 4.3, 'Estimates and Appropriations' of both years. Several supplementary 
estimates are commonly made through the course of the year. 
155 Telephone conversation I I July 1986 with Allan Darling of the Programme Branch of 
Treasury Board. Mr Darling also stated that there had been no recent demands for 
funds for legal purposes in supplementary estimates. A further telephone conversation 
on 15 July 1986 with L. Endemann, Treasury Board officer for the Department of 
Justice, confirmed that to his knowledge funds for legal liability are never found in the 
main estimates. 
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Totals and weighted averages 
unlikely that the budgetary process would entail financial recognition of 
particular legal liability costs. 
THE STATE'S CAPITAL MARKETS 
One explanation of the data is that the constraints on the ability of 
governments to raise funds are radically different from the constraints 
that efficient capital markets theoretically place on private firms. If we 
relax the assumption that the state will react to liability risks in the same 
manner as a private firm, it is not as clear that the adoption of a direct state 
liability rule is desirable - and it is fair to say that the assumption is 
difficult to support. It is trite that central governments are not con- 
strained by the same markets as private economic actors, and thus 
effective public policy analysis of government liability should employ very 
different as~umptions. '5~ 
156 I point out later that if attention is focused on municipal governments, fiscally 
independent sub-units of governments, and the like, the effect of liability rules is more 
likely to track the effect I predict in private markets. 
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Our ability to use economic sanctions in the case of private firms is 
effectively limited by several factors, including a restriction on the size of 
sanctions in view of our ideas about equal treatment, the social costs of 
bankruptcy if damage awards are raised to a sufficient level, and the 
increasing marginal costs of increasing fines coupled with decreasing 
marginal benefits.157 It is equally true that the utility of economic 
sanctions in the case of the state will be limited by a range of factors, which, 
while different from those operating in the private sector, are equally 
relevant to our analysis. In the end we must begin to think about the way 
in which the state reacts or  will react to economic signals imposed by 
courts. 
One assumption underlying the response of private firms to economic 
signals is that competition among private firms in capital markets defines 
winners and losers, and hence inefficient or  efficient behaviour. Govern- 
ments, however, are the only game in town, and that town is unique. 
Although comparisons between different administrations in different 
jurisdictions are undoubtedly valuable, such comparisons, given the 
differing political climates, resource bases, histories, and social situations 
of nations, can never be definitive of 'efficient' action. Therefore, the state 
is not subject to the constraints of a capital market, and it is unable to apply 
the lessons that have been learned by private firms in the competition for 
capital. 
Decisions to allocate losses in governments must be sensitive to the 
appropriation process by which administrative units obtain their capital 
requirements for current and future programs. Under certain assump- 
tions we might think that administrative units will be responsive to liability 
rules. That is, we might assume that competition among bureaucracies for 
legislative appropriations is analogous to the competition of private 
enterprise in capital markets.15' Government appropriation decisions 
would reflect an assessment of the return to the social welfare on the 
public's capital investment for the previous budgetary period, and the 
public's prediction of its expected return for the current period. Where 
the appropriation process operates in this fashion, the imposition of losses 
will result in a reduced ability of the bureaucracy to raise funds. Damage 
payments and associated transaction costs associated with tort claims will 
reduce the regulatory benefits otherwise achievable by the relevant depart- 
157 See Kraakman, supra note 71,881. Many of  these ideas are developed by Christopher 
Stone in Where the Law End.: The Social Control of Corporate Behaviour (New York: Harper 
and Row 1975) chapter 6. 
158 See R.A. Posner 'The Behaviour of Administrative Agencies' (1972) I J. of Legal Studies 
305, at 323-44, and Posner 'Theories of Economic Regulation' (1974) 5 BellJ. Econ. 
335. 
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ment.'59 TO the extent that the ability of particular units to obtain capital 
is influenced and monitored by the suppliers of financial resources, we 
can expect that the imposition of liability will have incentive effects. 
One immediate problem with applying this model is the difficulty in 
measuring the inefficiencies associated with government negligence. It is 
almost impossible for owners of the state to assess whether their agents are 
generating maximum returns on their 'tax' investments. If citizens could 
evaluate outputs, then inefficient inputs (which would include social costs 
associated with the production of public goods and which would be 
reflected in a reduction of outputs) could be monitored and responded to 
in the same way that actors in finance markets respond to inefficiencies in 
private firms. In that world we would enjoy the perfectly efficient state 
(whatever that means), and liability rules would be irrelevant. 
It is safe to assume that what I call 'political capital markets' - 
represented by the activities of senior bureaucrats and politicians, as 
agents of taxpayers, in monitoring and evaluating the return on public 
investments - are substantially less efficient than capital markets are in 
the case of private investments. For example, under the accountability 
mechanisms developed from the Lambert Commission recommenda- 
t ion~ , '~"  the allocation of resources through the budgetary process 
involves two stages. The first is the establishment of priorities and overall 
expenditure and revenue figures by centralized federal authorities; the 
second is the allocation of revenues among competing departments and 
programs employing the so-called envelope system. The overall level of 
expenditure is determined in the light of government fiscal strategy and 
available projected revenues, and then resources are allocated through 
competition among various policy committees representing departments 
and agencies. While this budgetary allocation process may result in the 
alignment of departmental budget proposals with overall fiscal policy, it 
fails to deal with the problem of ensuring that losses allocated to a 
particular department influence budgetary appropriations. 
159 See C.R. Wise 'Liability of Federal Officials: An Analysis of Alternatives'(lg83) 45 Pub. 
Admin. Rev. 746, at 751. Wise suggests that, in the context of developing an 
indemnification fund for individuals who commit constitutional torts, the charges that 
each agency incurs should appear on their budgets, and that an officer of the Office of 
Management and Budget should be on the fund's board. See also S.G. Hadden (ed.) 
Risk Analysis, Institutions and Public Policy (Port Washington, N Y :  Associated Faculty 
Press 1984) 5, 34-5.64-5. 
160 The Royal Commission on Financial Management and Accountability (the Lambert 
Commission) was appointed in 1976 to examine financial management policy and 
practices in the federal bureaucracy, with specific reference to effective financial 
accountability. The commission issued its report in 1979: Final Report, Royal Commicsion 
on Financial Management and Accountability (Hull, PQ: Canadian Government Publishing 
Centre 1979). 
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The federal government expenditure budget process begins approxi- 
mately one and a half years before the fiscal year for which the budget is 
intended.16' It involves negotiations within a department, with the 
Treasury Board Secretariat, and with the Treasury Board itself, and 
continues through the fiscal year in which the budget is actualized 
through supplementary estimates.l6* A departmental budget consists of 
two major components. The  first is an A budget, which funds existing 
programs at the same level as the previous fiscal year, taking changes into 
account. It includes regular operating expenditures, including damage 
claims against the Crown arising out of the departmental activities. The 
second is a B budget, which comprises proposals for new funds required 
for the implementation of new programs or  the enhancement of existing 
ones. In practice, the A budget is seldom closely scrutinized, except 
intradepartmentally when an assessment of a long-standing program is 
undertaken, usually with a view to enhancing the program or replacing it 
with a more extensive one. The A budget programs are rarely analysed, as 
in zero-based budgeting, to determine present efficiency.163 Until very 
recently, the A budget submitted by line departments representing 
current program allocations was considered politically sacrosanct, and 
only the B budget representing proposed programs would be subject to 
budgetary review in any meaningful sense of the term.I64 
Even assuming that damage claims were allocated to the appropriate 
unit with government, it is likely that they would be considered expendi- 
tures related to ongoing programs, and would simply be ammunition for 
increased A-budget allocation arguments. In the end, losses would be 
passed on to o w n e r - t a ~ ~ a ~ e r s . ' ~ 5  Thus, the incentive effects of liability 
rules must be predicated on implementing budgetary reforms to ensure a 
level of scrutiny that would reveal legal liability risks. Incentives will be 
generated only if we design a system to appraise and measure program 
results (including tort losses), and link those results to the budgetary 
process. In other words, for losses to be internalized, program execution 
161 Hartle, supra note 154~34-6 This description is accurate, even taking into account the 
significant procedural and structural reforms of the budget setting and review process 
that have taken place in recent years. See Hartle 'The Expenditure Budget Process of 
the Government of Canada: A Public Choice-Rent-Seeking Perspective' Canadian Tax 
Paper no. 81 (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation 1988) 101-7 and 134-47. 
162 Hartle, supra note 154.34-6 
163 Ibid. 38,41,42-3 
164 See A. Wildavsky The Politics of theBudgetary Process gd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown 1979) 
and G.B. Doern and R.W. Phidd Canadian Public Policy: I&m, Stmture ,  Process 
(Toronto: Methuen 1983) 262-3. 
165 It is likely that other aspects of the Lambert Commission proposals dealing with policy 
and expenditure management and with accountability within the public service would, 
if properly implemented, reduce that problem. 
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- the delivery of regulatory benefits (with their associated costs) - must be 
linked to resource allocation in the budgetary process.'66 
A slightly different perspective on the response of the government to 
liability focuses on the choice of payment mechanism, which theoretically 
offers an alternative source of regulatory control. Federal Court awards 
are defined as statutory payments pursuant to the Federal Court Act, and 
damage awards ordered to be paid by the federal government in Federal 
Court judgments are paid out of the consolidated revenue fund.167 The 
Public Accounts records judgments by department, but the funds paid out 
of the consolidated revenue fund are not charged to particular depart- 
mental budgets.16' Unless internal administrative steps are adopted to 
allocate this loss to a particular department o r  other subsidiary of 
government, it is unlikely that the risk of liability will be relevant in 
departmental decision-making. 
The impact of liability rules may also be influenced by the design of the 
settlement process within government. A range of institutional and 
procedural mechanisms regulate settlements of Federal Court claims, 
and it is clear that the impact of liability rules will be influenced by the 
design of the settlement process in government institutions.169 Under the 
claims regulations enacted pursuant to the federal Financial Administra- 
tion Act,''" settlements of claims where the total amount of all claims 
arising out of the same matter is less than $200,000 can be made only by 
166 In a sense, the Lambert Commission recognized that some link was necessary, but the 
overall impression one gets from the report is that the central authorities should leave 
management to management. The commission suggests that after allocating resources 
to departments, the central expenditure-allocating authority should permit 'individual 
departments and agencies to manage their affairs in a way that will best achieve the 
objectives assigned to them with the resources available': Final Report, supra not 148, 
64. 
None the less, the commission did recognize that effectiveness-evaluation of 
programs was necessary, and recommended the establishment of a Board of 
Management to replace the Treasury Board, with responsibility lodged in a Financial 
Management Secretariat to ensure the effective management of departmental and 
agency financial resources. See O.P. Dwivedi 'On Holding Public Servants Account- 
able' in O.P. Dwivedi (ed.) The Administrative State in Canada (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press 1982) 159. 
167 ~ s c  1970 nd Supp., c. F-lo, ss. 55(2), 57(3), and j n  
168 Telephone conversation 4 July 1986 with M. Duffy, Toronto regional office of Federal 
Department of Justice I 
169 It is a fair assumption that the number and magnitude of settled claims far exceeds the 
number and financial impact of court judgments. 
170 Claims Regulations, CRC 1978, c. 683, amended S O R / ~ Z - ~ O ~ ,  pursuant to the Financial 
Administration Act, ~ s c  1970, C. F-10, S. 6. The claims regulatlonscited above indicate a 
limit of $50,000. However, Robin Findlay of the Office of the Controller General, in a 
discussion with me on 15 July 1986, indicated that the limit was raised to $2oo,ooo to 
reflect enhanced ministerial responsibility. See SOR/ 86- 10 14, part 11 Canada Gazette vol. 
I 20 ,  no. 22. 
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the department after an opinion is obtained from the deputy attorney 
general. Claims exceeding $2oo,ooo are payable only with Treasury 
Board approval. In practice, however, claims are 'settled' by means of 
consent orders from Federal Court judges, which, like Federal Court 
awards,'7' are paid out of the consolidated revenue fund, and do not have 
an impact on specific departmental budgets.'7' 
Unless internal administrative steps are adopted to allocate these 
settlement payments to a particular department or other subsidiary 
government unit, it is unlikely that the risk of liability will be relevant in 
departmental decision-making. Assuming that the response of a depart- 
ment to economic risks that are focused on its budget is different from its 
response when the risks are shifted to the consolidated revenue fund, the 
impact of liability rules will differ, depending on the magnitude of the 
losses they generate. Under the current settlement processes, relatively 
small losses may have substantially greater effects on departmental 
behaviour than significant losses that are allocated to general revenues. 
As a general policy, the internalization of social costs is likely to be 
achieved only if both damage awards and settlements are paid out of 
departmental budgets and are not shifted to general revenues. 
Finally, there are damage claims that are made against particular 
departments but are not pursued through the Federal Court. Demands 
for compensation from the government in situations where liability may 
be impossible to establish, or where liability on the government's part is 
non-existent, but where, for unarticulated reasons, compensation is 
indicated, may be dealt with through a system of formally authorized ex 
gratia payments. These payments are not made as a response to potential 
legal liability, and, like damage awards and settlement 'consent' orders, 
are made out of the consolidated revenue fund.'73 
The ultimate financial control of all of these government expenditures 
- that is, ex gratia payments, damages awards, and settlements - resides 
with the Treasury Board, which is made up of five ministers of the 
Crown.'74 The secretariat of the Treasury Board provides the board with 
171 Telephone conversation, 7 July 1986 with Paul Olivier, secretary to the Commission of 
Inquiry into Certain Banking Matters, and retired associate deputy minister of the 
Department of Justice 
172 Similar institutional mechanisms operate in the United States under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act, 28 usc, ss. 2672,2677, and 2678 ( 1970). This act permits an agency to settle 
claims up to $ag,ooo, and it seems that costs up to $25,000 would be allocated to the 
agency budget. These claims are not subject to an opinion from the Justice 
Department. Larger claims are paid from general revenues, but for claims greater than 
$25,000 a legal opinion from the United States Department of Justice is required. 
173 Robin Findlay, supra note I 70 
174 Financial Administration Act, supra note 170, s. ~ ( 2 )  
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the detailed information and budgetary analysis necessary to support the 
board in its decisions.'75 While secretariat resources might be used in 
establishing a feedback mechanism for damage awards, discussions with 
the Treasury Board's financial officer to the Department of Justice 
indicate that the board does not undertake a careful examination of 
specific financial losses associated with legal liability. Such monitoring 
would be expensive, and, given the magnitude of current exposure, yields 
data that are of minimal relevance to the funding decisions of the 
Treasury ~ o a r d . 1 7 ~  Furthermore, discussions with the Treasury Board's 
expenditure analysis group indicate that in general there is no assessment 
of settlement payments. The Treasury Board analysis has usually focused 
on macroeconomic issues and has not been applied to expenditures of the 
type and magnitude associated with current legal liability risks.'77 
In addition to the potential impact of awards and settlements, legal 
liability risks might be signalled through the impact of the cost of legal 
services. All departments retain legal counsel whose function is much like 
that of lawyers employed by private firms: the department acts as a client, 
and decides how and whether to use counsel's advice.'7' Almost all 
litigation, however, is undertaken by Department of Justice 1 a ~ y e r s . l ~ ~  
Payment of large settlements and litigation decisions are made after 
consultation between the departments. None the less, it seems clear that 
the legal expertise of Department of Justice lawyers predominates, and 
the conduct of litigation is controlled by that  department.'*^ The 
Department of Justice funds the litigation, and other departmental 
budgets are not affected by the costs of litigation services.'" 
One can conclude that the collective impact of the current treatment of 
legal liability costs to the government (which includes budgetary alloca- 
tion mechanisms, Treasury Board review, the payment of damage claims, 
settlements, and ex gratia payments from the consolidated revenue fund, 
and the allocation of legal costs to the Department of Justice) presents the 
175 Hartle, supre note 154. 15 
176 L. Endemann, supra note 155 
177 Telephone conversation 15 July 1986 with F. Lane, group chief of expenditure policy 
and planning analysis of the Treasury Board 
178 Telephone conversation 14 July 1986 with Mr Heiss of the legal department of 
Transport Canada I 
179 An exception is tax litigation, where the Department of National Revenue employs its 
own litigation specialists. Departments will also pay out of their own budgets for private 
sector legal advisers hired on an ad hoc basis: L. Endemann, supra note 155. 
180 Paul Olivier, supra note I 7 I 
181 An officer of the Treasury Board's expenditure analysis group stated that there was no 
assessment of legal work costs or  the payment of settlements. The allocation of legal 
costs would be subject to negotiation between individual departments and the 
Department of Justice: F. Lane, supra note I 77. 
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government with a 'capital market' very different from that faced by 
private firms. The description of these mechanisms suggests that legal 
liability will have only attenuated incentive effects in the absence of 
additional mechanisms within government which would reallocate that 
liability to individual departmental budgets. No institutional mechanism 
currently operating within the federal government bureaucracy achieves 
that goal. Any reduction in primary accident costs would require much 
more sensitive financial control in government, as well as the uncoerced 
co-operation of the relevant departments. 
LIMITING FACTORS 
Even if we were to redesign the budgetary approval process, link it with 
auditing procedures that revealed contingent liability risks, and allocate 
damage claims, settlement costs, exgratia payments, and legal expenses to 
specific departments, we would still have to recognize the limiting factors 
that operate in the case of governments (but do not operate in the case of 
most private firms) and that influence our ability to use tort law as a 
regulatory instrument."* 
One critical factor affecting the instrumental impact of liability awards 
is a reflection of the non-market characteristics of many public services 
and goods. Those characteristics may mean that output reductions may 
not occur in response to legal liability costs. We assume, in the case of 
private firms, that increases in costs associated with liability awards, to the 
extent that they are not reduced efficiently, are reflected in the price of 
the firm's goods.'83 AS the price increases, demand is reduced, and the 
absolute number of goods in the market will decrease. As the number of 
goods decreases, aggregate accident costs also decrease. 
However, governments often use non-market vehicles to distribute 
public services. In such cases the output price may be zero; even when it is 
not, in many cases the output price bears little or no relationship to c0st.'~4 
If that is so, even if social costs represented by damage awards were 
'internalized' to the government, there might not be any concomitant 
reduction in output, and thus no reduction in accident costs associated 
182 Many of these points reflect the 'bureaucratic' element of  public bureaucracies, and 
thus are equally applicable to private, corporate bureaucratic conduct. See C.D. Stone 
Where the Law Ends (New York: Harper and Row 1975) especially at 93-1 18. 
183 That is, a firm faced with potential legal liability will take cost-effective accident 
reduction measures to the point that the marginal benefit associated with the measures 
equals the reduced liability exposure. All losses that are not thus avoided will be 
incurred, and the price at which goods are sold will reflect both the cost of the efficient 
accident-reduction-measures and the residual liability risks. 
184 See W.F. Baxter 'Enterprise Liability, Public and Private' (1978) 42 Law &' Contemp. 
Prob. 45, at 51 .  
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with increased prices. In addition, it is not clear that it would be desirable, 
given the objectives of the government programs, to reduce output even 
if we would otherwise want to. Decision-makers who impose legal liability 
on the government in an effort to reduce primary accident costs should 
take into account that this element of primary accident costs reduction 
may be absent in the case of state action. 
A second limiting factor influencing the desirability of using tort law to 
regulate public bureaucracies is the ability of the government to shift the 
losses back to victims or  other members of the public through retroactive 
legislation. Perhaps the best-known example of this was the decision, 
made first by the Tory government and then by the Labour government, 
to enact the War Damage ~ c t " 5  in England in 1965. That act retroactively 
abolished the common law right to compensation for damage to property 
associated with acts carried out by the government during or in 
contemplation of the outbreak of war. The legislation was enacted in 
response to a 1965 decision of the House of Lords in Burmah Oil Co. Ltd v. 
Lord ~dvocate' '~ which had recognized a claim for over $loo million 
dollars arising out of the destruction of the claimant's property during the 
British retreat from Rangoon in 1942. The risk of such state retaliation 
might be small, but it strengthens my thesis that attempts to internalize 
losses associated with state action cannot be modelled on liability rules 
designed for private firms. 
The idea represented in Burmah Oil is central to an understanding of 
the efficiency of government liability. The evaluation of compensation 
payments and their associated incentive effects should acknowledge that 
state liability necessarily involves the judiciary's directing the investment 
of public resources in risk-reducing measures o r  compensation payments 
that would otherwise be allocated to achieving agency objectives. One can 
expect that the agency will have a comparative advantage in determining 
when the marginal costs of accident reduction investments exceed the 
associated marginal benefits of those investments, and when alternative 
uses of the resources will optimize social welfare.''' 
A third limiting factor is the willingness and ability of the government 
department or the government as an institution to shift losses to its 
'owners' - that is, the tax-paying public. If the government is not 
185 1 9 6 5 , ~ .  18 
186 [1965] AC 75. Apparently, the legislation was also motivated by the existence of several 
other potential claimants in the same position as the Burmah Oil Company. See Note 
'The Burmah Oil Affair' (1966) 79 Ham. LR 614. 
187 This also assumes away the distorting effects of bureaucratic self-interest discussed in 
the public choice literature. See the text accompanying notes 98-1 1 I supra. 
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constrained to operate at optimal levels of taxation"' and to adopt 
optimal monetary policies, then all losses shifted to the government by the 
courts can be shifted to the community, subject only to the marginal cost 
in lost votes. If one assumes that tax and monetary policy as currently 
formulated does not operate within constraints that are relevant at the 
marginal dollar levels represented by tort losses, then liability rules 
applied to governments'89 will have no impact on the behaviour of 
bureaucrats, and will merely generate substantial transaction costs as 
wealth is shifted from one group of (tort) victims to a second group of (tort 
law) victims.'go 
One way to understand whether and why the government will be likely 
to pass on 'tort' costs is to evaluate the motives of the bureaucratic agency. 
One model of bureaucratic organization postulates that bureaucracies 
seek to maximize their expenditures.'Y1 In the absence of devices that use 
the tax structure to control the 'tendencies of government to grow without 
bound"g2 or effective central bureaucratic or legislative review to monitor 
and regulate particular bureaucratic budgets, agencies that conform to 
this model will always pass regulatory tort costs on to the tax-paying 
public. In fact, if the judgment requires funds not currently appropriated, 
the judicial order is implicitly directed against the legislatures or other 
governmental unit controlling the expenditure process. Merely awarding 
damages in these cases would only justify demands for additional bureau 
funding.'93 If one assumes this model of government, then liability rules 
will not generate increases in allocative efficiency. 
A different model of bureaucracy that can be applied to predict the 
188 Even if it were, it would be unrealistic to expect the courts to determine what the 
optimal level of taxation is, and even more unrealistic to think that the courts could 
determine whether the government was operating at the optimal level. There is 
nothing which requires that we use courts as the review institution, but there is no 
obvious institutional candidate that would be able effectively to carry out those tasks. 
189 As discussed earlier, funds paid out in tort claims are taken from the consolidated 
revenue fund. Under section 17(2) of the Federal Court Act, supra note 167, all 
damage awards against the federal government are allocted to the consolidated 
revenue fund. 
190 The extent to which the state will pass costs on to the public depends on a number of 
subsidiary variables, including taxation policy, fiscal policy, and the impact of taxation 
decisions on investment, production, voting behaviour, and so on. 
191 This model was developed more fully in part 2. See W.A. Niskanen J r  Bureaucmcy and 
Representative Government (Chicago: Aldine, Atherton 197 1) and Niskanen 'Bureaucrats 
and Politician's (1975) 18 J .  of Law and Econ. 6 17. 
192 Mueller, supra note 23, 167 
193 See Edelman v. Jordon 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (decision to fashion award as a retroactive 
injunction against state official requiring agency to dispense funds from treasury, 
reversed). See Yudof, supra note 69, 1349 et seq. 
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response of the government to the imposition of regulatory tort costs is 
one in which bureaucrats are motivated to maximize their personal 
welfare. In this world bureaucrats are expected to make choices that will 
increase personal income, personal and institutional power, or personal 
ideals of the public good. '94 Bureaucracies conforming to this model may 
develop efficient accident-reduction policies - but only when the victims 
of accidents are able to organize effectively and bring political pressure 
(costs) to bear either directly on  the relevant bureaucracy o r  indirectly on 
political actors who are able to influence bureaucratic activity.'95 If the 
actual and potential tort victims are not easily identifiable or are widely 
dispersed, poorly organized, and politically unsophisticated, bureaucratic 
agencies that conform to this model probably will remain immune from 
the effect of liability rules. 
One might argue that liability rules coupled with constraints on taxation 
which preclude passing regulatory costs on to taxpayers (if combined effectively) 
would provide the necessary incentive on the part of agencies to develop 
and implement accident-reduction policies. The  use of the tax system to 
constrain bureaucracies'g6 suffers from the obvious defect that we cannot 
always view government as a grasping Leviathan, and that legitimate 
welfare-maximizing and redistributive government objectives may de- 
mand specific levels of taxation. Given a range of possible government 
models and motives, the blunt instrument of a tax constraint as a solution 
to the unconstrained costs of bureaucratic negligence does not appear to 
be justified. 
A fourth and final limiting factor on the use of tort law as a regulatory 
194 This model was described in part 2. I t  is developed more fully in A. Downs An Economic 
Theoq of Democracy (New York: Harper 1gj7), and G. Tullock 'Problems of Majority 
Voting' (1959) 67 J. of Pol. Econ. 57 1. 
195 As I point out later, however, it is quite likely that the ability of superior bureaucrats to 
control effectively the activities of  line officers is overestimated. A more important 
point is that this model posits that the regulatory impact of tort law is a product of 
political variables - the imposition of political costs, and the signalling of potential 
political responses - and not  of economic costs and signals. If that is so, it is equally 
plausible that we d o  not need economic signals at all, and thus the design of a regulatory 
instrument effective against governments should focus on political rather than 
economic incentives. I develop the signalling model of government liability in part 5. 
196 G. Brennan and J.M. Buchanan 'Towards a Tax  Constitution for Leviathan' (1977) 8 J. 
of Pub. Econ. 255. Unlike most analyses of tax policy, Brennan and Buchanan do not 
postulate a fixed amount of revenue as being necessary to achieve public policy 
objectives. They suggest that the government be limited to taxing the more elastic tax 
bases, that certain inelastic tax bases be sheltered from taxation entirely, and that taxes 
be imposed on all persons equally to limit the government's ability to discriminate and 
thus expand its revenue. As Mueller puts it, '"horizontal equity" would be favoured ... 
because it limits the government's degrees of freedom, and not for any other ethical 
reasons': supra note 23, 169. 
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instrument is the inability of large bureaucracies to respond to liability 
rules even if some individual bureaucrats are motivated to do so. 
Although economic costs generated by liability rules are relevant to 
superior bureaucrats whose budgets are constrained and who are 
motivated to minimize social costs, those superior bureaucrats will also 
respond to internal political risks. Those risks may manifest themselves in 
reorganization costs or  bureaucratic hostility to change, both of which 
may present substantial countervailing incentives, resulting in a failure to 
respond to liability risks imposed by an exogenous review institution.lg7 
The inability of agencies to respond to legal liability rules is exacerbated 
by an asymmetry between the incentives faced by low-level bureaucrats 
and those faced by senior bureaucrats who are confronted with liability 
claims. For example, a municipal police department that is confronted by 
internal disciplinary measures in response to legal liability may respond 
by organizing and working to rule or engaging in work stoppages.'g8 A 
study of the Detroit police force, which documented 'unprecedented' 
damage payments, concluded that obtaining co-operation from police 
officers was extraordinarily difficult in view of the interests of the police 
officers in continuing their current practices.lg9 Paradoxically, superior 
bureaucrats are likely to respond to internally generated costs associated 
with their attempts at program modi f ica t i~n . '~~  If the expected internally 
generated costs exceed the expected tort costs, the downward signal 
generated by tort claims will be significantly d i ~ t o r t e d . ~ ~ '  The process of 
regulating bureaucracies is expensive, time-consuming, uncertain, and 
potentially embarrassing. Moreover, it may significantly affect depart- 
197 For example, in Connecticut the existence of section 1983 damage actions apparently 
did not affect police department practices, partly because the attitude at superior 
departmental levels was typically one of complete support for line officers, and partly 
because of the political dependence of municipal officials on police agencies. See 'Suing 
the Police in Federal Court' supra note 42, 813, 814. 
In Owen v. City of Independence 445 U.S. 662 (1980) and Payton v. United States 636 F .  nd 
I 32 (1981) the court expressed the view that the potential threat of government liability 
was of limited relevance to officials, particularly when they perceived their department 
as strongly supporting their actions. 
198 Schuck, supra note 5 7, 139 
199 Littlejohn, supra note I 7, 409-10 
200 Schuck admits this when he refers to the difficult senior bureaucrats experience in 
trying to influence the street-level bureaucrats' behatiour, given the 'intense spirit, 
loyalty and respect' engendered among government employees working in street-level 
departments: Schuck, supra note 57, 106. 
201 Furthermore, the idea that information is distorted as it moves up through bureaucrat- 
ic organization applies with equal force to information moving down. In addition, the 
internal bureaucratic costs will, by definition, be borne by the agency and superior 
bureaucrats, while the economic costs of damage awards are likely to be charged to 
consolidated revenue funds. See the text accompanying notes 167-1 72 supra. 
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mental morale and produce additional conflict with co-workers, unions, 
program beneficiaries, and politicians.'"' 
v Possible solutions 
If one accepts that only the net margznal benefits of liability rules count, it 
may be possible to design liability rules that take into account the ability of 
governments to pass on tort costs and to respond effectively to liability 
risks. It may be argued that there are some general distinctions, which, 
while imperfect, can be relatively easily applied, and which might 
generate optimal liability rules in a limited subset of cases. For example, 
liability rules might recognize that government is not a monolith, and that 
it is itself structured through departments, Crown corporations, indepen- 
dent administrative agencies, program units, units with geographical o r  
geopolitical responsibilities, public hospitals, and so on. With that in 
mind, one might assume that some of these sub-units will attempt to 
maximize profits, and thus should operate subject to liability rules 
analogous to those applicable to private economic actors. That is, it is 
superficially attractive to propose that liability rules should be used as a 
loss-internalizing instrument for a limited subset of 'efficient' state 
actors.'O3 
This proposal assumes that state institutions may be 'efficient' in two 
very different senses. In part 11 I argued that 'efficient' bureaucratic 
decisions represent choices motivated by an interest in maximizing social 
welfare, and, to the extent that they achieve that objective, it is not 
appropriate o r  feasible to subject them to liability rules. At the same time, 
in a limited set of cases, it can be assumed that the state will be motivated to 
maximize its own private welfare, and to the extent that it achieves that 
objective it will be 'efficient.""4 
An example of this second category of state actor, for which liability 
rules might be appropriate, is a state enterprise that is engaged in 
delivering goods and services through a market vehicle, that is relatively 
independent of central bureaucracies, and that has adopted a corporate 
model of economic organization traditionally employed by private 
economic actors. Here it might be assumed that the state is seeking to 
maximize its private welfare to some degree. In this case, as in the case of 
202  Mashaw, supra note 59, 23 
203 This argument is applicable both to a limited subset of bureaucracies that are in fact 
efficient and to a related subset o f  bureaucracies that are merely motivated by 
efficiency criteria but fail to achieve either superior or optimal outcomes. 
204 While it may be legitimate to assume that both models o f  state action are currently 
reflected in bureaucratic 'practices and organization, it may also be impossible to 
distinguish one from the other, and in some instances, bureaucratic action will reflect 
mixed motivations. 
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private firms, tort law may appear attractive to ensure that the state 
enterprise responds to the social costs of its activities.'O5 In other words, in 
designing optimal liability rules we might try to distinguish between state 
actors that are motivated by social welfare-maximizing objectives (and are 
efficient in that sense) and to which a 'no liability' rule should be applied, 
and state actors that are motivated by profit-maximizing objects (and are 
efficient in that different limited sense) and to which either strict or fault 
liability rules should be applied.'06 
That idea is embodied in the approach that has been taken by the courts 
- - 
in treating Crown corporations engaged in 'non-governmental' activities 
as private firms, and thus denying them traditional governmental 
immunities.'"7 If one can identify state actors motivated by private 
wealth-maximization objectives, liability rules designed to internalize 
social costs appear superficially attractive.208 If we determine that a 
particular loss was associated with actions motivated by private welfare 
motives, this proposal requires liability rules that would force the state 
enterprise to take into account the social costs of its activities; in this case, 
the public enterprise would be indistinguishable from a private firm. 
While this approach is frequently advocated by proponents of an 
expanded government liability, it presents several intractable problems. 
At the very least one would have to determine whether the particular 
subject of review was efficient in attempting to achieve socially optimal 
outcomesZ0g o r  if it was efficient in seeking to maximize its private 
205 See Spitzer, supra note 5, 527. 
206 The  public enterprise acts like a private firm in terms of its treatment of social costs 
(that is, it tries to externalize them), but this does not mean that it will respond to liability 
rules in the same way private firms can be expected to. If public enterprises are 
inefficient relative to private firms whose management is subject to monitoring 
through capital markets, there is no reason to think that these agency costs are the 
result of the public enterprise's having internalized social costs. 
207 Trebilcock and Prichard, supra note 2 5, I 8. T h e  cases on this point are voluminous: see 
Halifax v. Hal* Harbour Commission [1g35] SCR 215; Radych v. Manitoba Power 
Commission [1g42] 2 DLR 776 (Man. CA); R .  v. OLRB exparteOntarioHousingCorp. (1971) 
19 DLR (3d) 47 (Ont. HC); MacLean v. Liquor Licence Board of Ontario (1975) 61 DLR (3d) 
237 (Ont. HC); and Bodrugv. Manitoba Housing and Renewal Corp. etal.  (1977) 79 DLR (3d) 
409 (Man. QB). See also C.H. McNairn 'The Ontario Crown Agency Act' (1973) 6 Ottawa 
LR I and Peter Hogg The Liability of the Crown in Australia, New Zealand, and the United 
Kingdom (Melbourne: Law Book Co. 197 I )  203-8,~ 12. 
Of course, if these public firms are integrated into government activities, the courts 
may treat them as government and immunize them from tort liability: Baccus SRL v. 
Swvicio Nacional del Trigo [ I  9563 3 All ER 7 I 5 (CA) Swiss Israel TradeBank v. Government of 
Salta [1g72] I Lloyd's Rep. 497, at 507 (QB) (separate legal entity carrying on 
commercial activities not an organ of government). 
208 See J.L. Sax 'Takings and the Police Power' (1964) 74 Yale LJ 36, at 63-7. 
209 As I argued earlier, if we concluded that the agency was motivated to maximize social 
welfare we then would determine the extent to which the socially optimal result was 
achieved. T o  the extent that it was not achieved, liability rules would be used tocorrect 
inefficiencies associated with the decisions. 
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welfare."" It is not clear to me that this determination can be made 
without incurring substantial costs. 
Furthermore, even if we determine that the public enterprise was 
motivated to maximize profits, we may want to recognize its 'public' 
aspect; and if the public firm is acting in part as a social welfare-maximizer, 
we do not want to oblige it to internalize social costs it has already taken 
into a c c o ~ n t . ~ '  ' Moreover, if we apply liability rules in this subset of cases, 
we can predict substantial investments by victims in arguing that the 
public corporation was acting in a 'business' capacity, and by the 
government in demonstrating that the firm was exercising 'governmen- 
tal' powers."' Formal tests would be inadequate, for government might 
legitimately argue that while the enterprise was organized as a public firm 
its operations were in fact those of the government, thus making the 
implicit argument that the enterprise was acting in a social welfare- 
maximizing mode."3 
We could propose that a public enterprise should always be treated like 
a private economic actor, but we must then admit that we may be 
allocating losses to the firm that already have been internalized. More- 
over, if we establish a formal rule that departments will be immune from 
liability while public corporations will be treated like private firms, we 
create artificial incentives for the government to choose the former over 
the latter as a policy instrument. 
An inability to distinguish among a range of bureaucratic models that 
may be operating at any given time suggests that a uniform liability rule 
applicable to all state enterprises is unlikely to generate optimal incentive 
structures. Even if it were possible to distinguish efficient from inefficient 
bureaucracies, it would still be necessary to inquire further into the 
precise form of efficiency operating in a particular bureaucracy. Further- 
2 l o  Furthermore, we must also be sensitive to the reality of a great deal of public enterprise: 
it may not conform to either model, but may reflect elements of both. 
21 1 It is notoriously difficult, however, to disaggregate public from private motives in the 
mixed public corporation. See A. Boardman, C. Eckel, M. Linde, and A.R. Vining 'An 
Overview of Mixed Enterprises in Canada' Ch. 26 in K.J. Rea and N. Wiseman (eds) 
Government and Enterprise in Canada (Toronto: Methuen 1985); A. Tupper and G. 
Bruce Doern 'Public Corporations and Public Policy in Canada' Ch. I in A. Tupper and 
G.B. Doern (eds) Public Corporations and Public Policy in Canada (Montreal: Institute for 
Research on Public Policy 1981); S. Brooks, Who's in Charge? The Mired Ownership 
Corporation in Canada (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy 1987) at I 1- 19. 
2 I 2 See G.F. Kugler Report of the Attornq General's Task Force on Sovereign Immunity (Trenton, 
NJ 1972) at 39,4 1. See also Berardinelli v. Ontario Howing Corporation (1979) go DLR (3d) 
48 I ,  at 493 (SCC) McGonegal v. Gray et al. [1g52] 2 DLR 16 I ,  at 170 (SCC); and Bradford 
Corporation v. Myers [ I  g 161 I AC 242. 
2 13 This is the type of argument one sees in cases like Mellingerv. NewBrunswickDevelopment 
Corporation [1g7 11 2 All ER 593, at 596 (CA) and Swiss Israel Trade Bank v. Government of 
Salta [1g72] Lloyd's Rep. 497 (QB). 
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more, there is no reason to assume that all decisions within a particular 
bureaucracy are characterized by one form of efficiency or  inefficiency in 
all situations. In fact, it seems that the administrative costs of drawing the 
distinctions at all these levels would make the entire exercise useless. If we 
cannot identify this subset of decisions at a reasonable cost, then a 
no-liability rule is optimal without additional self-regulatory responses by 
the state."4 
An alternative solution to the limitations inherent in applying liability 
rules to government enterprises engaging in 'non-governmental' func- 
tions is to focus the economic signals generated by liability rules on 
sub-bureaus within government. In part I I considered only two objects of 
government liability - the individual bureaucrat and the government."5 
In reality, and as a theoretical proposition, we can focus liability rules on 
any of a number of sub-units, and the incentive effects of legal risks are 
not identical for all possible units. For example, the extent to which 
governments can pass costs on to taxpayers may depend on the level of 
government - municipal, provincial, or federal - to which the losses are 
shifted by the court. In addition, one can impose liability on intragovern- 
ment units, since there is no reason to restrict ourselves to formal legal or  
political units; various proposals have been made to allocate liability to a 
point somewhere between the individual bureaucrat (exposing her 
personal wealth to liability risks) and the government (exposing general 
revenues to compensation claims). 
If our aim is to signal information about losses associated with state 
action, we should design a liability regime that shifts losses to an 
intermediate node within government which has managerial, superviso- 
ry, and budgetary authority over the relevant a~tivities."~ This reform 
would necessitate the recognition of non-corporate intragovernment 
units, but this does not seem to create insurmountable problems."7 If 
liability were imposed in this fashion, it is likely that the marginal benefits 
of liability would be maximized, and that the marginal costs generated by 
review errors and the administrative costs would be minimized. 
This approach could involve several subsidiary elements, which would 
2 14 That is because we would still be faced with the ability of governments to pass costs on to 
taxpayers, and we would still have to evaluate the impact o f  the political market in 
influencing the relevant bureaucracy to internalize losses and the marginal net benefits 
o f  the liability regime. 
2 15 The possibility of imposing liability on superior bureaucrats as well as on line officers 
was discussed briefly, but there appears to be no advantage to using that liability 
regime. This point is discussed in part I supra. 
216 See Mashaw, supra note 59 ,34  and Schuck, supra note 57, 106. 
217 See Northern Pipeline Agency v. Perehinec (1983) I DLR (4th) I (scc) (legal identity 
inferred from status-allocating agency powers). 
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increase its ability to influence government activity in the appropriate 
circumstances. For example, liability would be imposed when political 
markets were not working effectively, and on institutions that were not 
subject to centralized authority. We might anticipate that state actions 
would be directed at maximizing aspects of bureaucratic welfare, given 
our assumptions about bureaucratic motives in unregulated contexts. As 
well, we could link the liability regime to state activities that were only 
tangentially related to bureau objectives and expertisen8 - 'in short, 
situations in which agency collection and use of information about 
employee negligence is costly o r  undervalued."'9 Moreover, if the power 
of the sub-unit of government to increase its budget is limited, as it is in the 
case of municipal governments, significant loss internalization may take 
place. 
The experience of municipalities suggests that more refined models of 
government liability, in which liability is imposed at sub-bureau nodes, 
may in limited circumstances be an attractive regulatory i n s t r ~ m e n t . ~ " ~  In 
this model the reviewing institution identifies the sub-units within the 
bureaucracy that have budgetary, managerial, and supervisory authority 
over the bureaucrats whose activities are associated with the injury, and 
allocates liability at that point in the bureaucracy. If we are accurate in 
identifying that node, and ifwe prevent that bureau from shifting losses to other 
bureaus or to general revenues, we may effectively force the unit to 
internalize social costs. Although the idea is attractive, and is supported by 
recent experiences with municipal liability, the proposal has several 
shortcomings. 
The most important is that bureaucratic budgetary, managerial, and 
supervisory authority may be allocated across several levels o r  units of 
government. In those cases it will be impossible to identify a single node 
on which to impose liability. For example, in the case of police torts, the 
enforcement responsibilities of the police, the institutional design of 
police forces, and managerial authority at the policy and operational 
levels cannot be allocated to a single government unit. Under the current 
federal tort regime, the federal government is not liable for the tort of 
municipal police officers,"' nor is the province."' Thus, the two 
218 In these cases, it is unlikely that redistributivejudgments would be subject to review. 
219 Mashaw, supra note 59, 33 
220  This model has been developed by Peter Schuck, supra note 57, 100-46. 
2 2  1 Schulze et al. v. The Queen (1 974) 47 DLR (3d) I 3 1 ,  17 ccc (2d) 24 1 (FCTD) (municipal 
police officers are not automatically agents, servants, or employees of the Federal 
Crown under section 3(1) of the Crown Liability Act, RSC 1970, C. c-38). 
222  See Allain v. Procureur General de la Province de Quebec [ I  97 i ]  cs 407, at q i I ,  and Attonley 
General for New South Wales v.  Perpetual Trurtee Co. Ltd [ i g j  j] 1 All ER 846 (PC). 
Heinonline - -  40 U. Toronto L.J. 266 1990 
government institutions which through legislative and regulatory action 
significantly define the enforcement responsibilities of municipal police 
officers are immune from liability. Moreover, the courts have decided 
that municipalities in Canada (which directly or indirectly through police 
commissions manage municipal police forces, exercise management 
powers of hiring, firing, and disciplining police officers, and fund police 
services) are not responsible for the torts of police officers who are 
enforcing federal and provincial legislation."3 
Given our interest in designing liability rules that will internalize 
accident losses; given the differential incentive effects of liability rules 
depending on the taxing powers of the governmental unit to which we 
direct liability; and given the mixed sources of authority and control over 
particular bureaus, identifying a sub-bureau within government is not as 
straightforward as one might think. One cannot assume that a bureau 
with budgetary control also will have supervisory and managerial 
authority over the relevant bureaucrats. 
The concept of intragovernment liability assumes that the review 
mechanism can effectively preclude the shifting of the losses away from 
the bureau. T h e  separate corporate existence, political status, taxing 
powers, and budgetary authority of municipal institutions suggests that in 
that limited area of state action the model might operate effectively. 
However, in the case of internal government departments, and sub- 
bureaus within departments, the model requires the creation of another 
bureau to monitor the subject bureau's budgetary allocations in current 
and future years to determine whether accident losses are being shif- 
ted."4 Only when public institutions are constrained by mechanisms 
223 See McLeave v. City of Moncton (1902) 32 SCR 106, 6 ccc 219; Caratozzolo v. Mudock 
Ewatrki and City of Edmonton (1982) 47 Alta. LR (2d) 394 (Alta QB); The Queen v. Labour 
Relatiow Board et al. (1955) 38 MPR 26 (NB); and Re St Cathannes Police Associaton and 
Board of Police Commicsioners [ig71] 15 DLR (3d) 532, I OR 430 (Ont. HC). At the same 
time, the municipality may be vicariously liable to victims if the police officers acted as 
agents of the city in the execution of municipal by-laws, ordinances, and similar 
legislation. The municipality may be directly liable if it appears that it approved or 
directed the police activity: City ofMontreal v. Plante (I  923) 34 Que. KB 137; Hebert v. City 
of Thetford-Mines [1g32] SCR 424, [ig32] 3 DLR 583. While Ontario and several other 
provinces have enacted legislation modifying that presumption (see Police Act,  so 
1980, c. 381, s. 24; Police Act, RSBC 1979, c. 33 1, S. 54; Provincial Police Act, SM 197 1, c. 
85, S. 21; and Police Act, RSS 1978, c. P-15, s. 48), municipal immunity continues in 
several provinces. Similar issues arise in the case of provincial police and the RCMP. In 
the latter case, the courts have held that federal officers are not employees of the 
provincial government. See Re Ombudsman for Saskatchewan [ig74] 46 DLR (3d) 452, at 
456-7, 5 WWR 176, at 179-80 (Sask. QB). But see Police Act, RSBC 1979, c. 33 1, SS. 1, 
16(2), and 53(1) (provincial government liable for torts of RCMP officers). 
224 AS discussed above, such internal institutional mechanisms are not operating within the 
federal government. See the text accompanying note 172 et seq. 
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comparable to those operating in capital markets can we anticipate the 
same loss-internalization impact of liability rules as in the case of private 
f i rm~.~ '5  The public review bureau designed to compel the internalization 
of social costs will generate its own administrative costs. In view of the 
nature of public budgetary allocations, it does not seem possible to 
distinguish requests for funds for new programs that will incorporate 
funds for accident losses from requests for programs that will not. Finally, 
the model assumes that the bureaucrats who will be responding to the 
signal are able to influence street-level bureaucrats in such a way as to 
reduce accident costs - and that, as we have seen, is not necessarily true. 
As well, the benefits of this model of liability must be assessed in the light 
of the impact of error costs in determining the relevant node. T o  the 
extent that errors are made, we will be creating inefficiencies that might 
easily offset the gains generated by the liability regime. 
Even if we could expect intragovernment units to respond to liability 
risks, it is not clear that liability rules are desirable. First, we would have to 
determine whether the specific department or public enterprise was 
acting in an inefficient manner in respect of the particular activity that is 
associated with the loss, or in an efficient manner that mimics the activities 
of a private firm.226 If the sub-unit is acting inefficiently, we then have to 
determine which of the inefficient models best describes the activities that 
are relevant to the inquiry. Moreover, attempts to allocate losses to a 
particular sub-unit within a bureaucracy may give rise to the externaliza- 
tion of losses associated with interinstitutional actions, which justified 
direct government liability in the first place. Even if the distinctions could 
be drawn, the administrative costs generated by the rules would be 
substantial. 
Only if tort losses are allocated to intrabureau units; only if those 
intragovernment bureaus are not permitted to pass the costs upwards to 
general revenue funds through budgetary appropriations over time; only 
if the bureaus do not take into account social costs ex ante; and only if the 
225 There are two points to be made here. First, the economic independence of many 
public enterprises, including Crown corporations, is a question of degree, as is the 
economic independence of private firms. To  the extent that private firms can turn to 
public resources when they are faced with costs, our ability to influence their behaviour 
approximates that of government. Second, it may be that liability rules have a greater 
impact on public firms, if those firms react to potential political costs to which private 
firms may be less sensitive. 
226 That is, even if wecould identify this intra-bureau node, we should imposeliability only 
when we assume that the bureau did not take into account the social costs ex ante. As I 
argued earlier, that assumption cannot be true in all cases, and in any event the 
alternative political accountability mechanisms will force internalization to some 
degree. 
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administrative costs associated with lost internalization are minimal will 
liability rules be an effective technique to internalize losses. 
The current budgetary allocation process does not force departments 
to internalize tort costs, and I doubt whether it is possible to design an  
efficient budgetary process that would achieve this outcome. Even i f  it 
were, the accountability mechanism consisting of budgetaly and fiscal review would 
not need to be triggered by the economic signal of tort claims. The description of 
the current budgetary mechanisms within government confirms the 
proposition that the economic environment of the state will effectively 
insulate it from liability rules unless it chooses to be bound by them. It may 
be that in limited circumstances it ought to do so, but incentives imposed 
by exogenous institutions do not appear to be a necessary or  viable 
regulatory technique. At best, tort claims might be a useful signal of 
breakdowns in other accountability mechanisms, but one must question 
whether other, more effective, signalling devices might be designed 
instead. 
Conclusion 
One purpose of tort law is to reduce the cost of accidents. In this paper I 
have explored the possible implications of using tort law to minimize the 
number and severity of accidents associated with activities of the federal 
government. The problem one faces in designing a regulatory instrument 
intended to influence government activity is to create an institution that 
permits interests of the constituency of 'potential and actual victims of 
state action' to be reflected (internalized) in public policy analysis and 
decision-making. My analysis suggests that tort law does not seem to be 
the instrument one would choose to achieve that end. Yet one advantage 
of tort law is that the victims of state action have a direct economic 
incentive to signal the harm which the government's activities have 
imposed or will impose on them. If we eliminate economic compensation 
from the regulatory instrument we must incorporate alternative incen- 
tives for victims to inform the relevant alternative regulatory actors of 
their losses. Potential victims can be expected to signal government if they 
perceive that the expected gains from signalling their potential losses (the 
gains associated with modification of the relevant program) exceed the 
costs of signalling. Actual victims will signal to the extent that we provide 
private incentives for them to do so. Again, the private incentive does not 
have to be related to their losses. Rather, we should set the amount of 
'recovery' so that the expected gain on signalling just exceeds the 
signalling costs. 
Since tort law is inappropriate as a vehicle to achieve that end, we 
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should consider alternative institutions that might be more successful. 
One candidate is a review institution that is independent of the govern- 
ment unit subject to the complaint, and that has the information, political 
power, and budgetary and managerial authority to respond to the 
economic signal which the liability rule represents."' Assuming that the 
review institution within the government is motivated by social welfare- 
maximizing objects, this institution could act as a focus for individual 
complainants to disclose their losses. The  institution could then function 
simply as a conduit for the information about the losses associated with 
state action, which is all that is necessary if our  assumption about motives 
is correct. This regulatory instrument could include the use of publicity by 
the review institution, which would permit alternative systems of political 
accountability to operate more e f f e ~ t i v e l ~ . " ~  
The conclusion we can draw from this analysis is that tort law, as it is 
presently conceived, is a poorly designed instrument to achieve regulato- 
ry objectives in the case of state action. Tort law operates as an effective 
behaviour-modification technique only in so far as it uses economic costs 
to signal the government that its activities are associated with private 
losses. To  influence state action we must couple the signal with budgetary 
and legislative constraints. These constraints are expensive and are prone 
to their own error costs. More important, to the extent that the constraints 
are operating effectively the need for economic signals is questionable. 
We might better direct our efforts towards designing effective 'political' 
markets instead of attempting to use economic signals to influence state 
and bureaucratic action. 
227 The  institution could be associated with an information-gathering function. 
228 See Fox 'Corporate Sanctions: Scope for a New Selectivisrn' (1982) Mersey LR 26, and B. 
Fiss and J. Braithwaite The Impact of Publicity on Corporate Offenders (Albany: State 
University of New York Press 1983) 
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